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a b s t r a c t
One of the main problems in component assembly is how to establish properties on the
assembly code by only assuming a limited knowledge of the single component properties.
Our answer to this problem is an architectural approach inwhich the software architecture
imposed on the assembly prevents black-box integration anomalies. The basic idea is to
build applications by assuming a “coordinator-based” architectural style.We, then, operate
on the coordinating part of the system architecture to obtain an equivalent version of the
system which is failure-free. A failure-free system is a deadlock-free one and it does not
violate any specified coordination policy. A coordination policy models those interactions
of components that are actually needed for the overall purpose of the system.We illustrate
our approach by means of an explanatory example and validate it on an industrial case
study that concerns the development of systems for safeguarding, fruiting, and supporting
the Cultural Heritage.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of the main problems in component assembly is related to the ability to establish properties on the assembly code
by only assuming a limited knowledge of the single component properties. Our answer to this problem is a software-
architecture-based approach in which the software architecture imposed on the assembly prevents black-box integration
anomalies. Notably, in the context of component-based concurrent systems, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) component
integrationmay cause deadlocks or other software anomalies within the system [4,19,20,28]. Building a system from a set of
COTS components introduces a set of problems.Many of themarise because of the nature of COTS components. They are truly
black-box and developers have no method of looking inside the box. This limit is coupled with an insufficient behavioural
specification of the components, which does not permit the understanding of the interaction of components. Component
assembly can result in architectural mismatches when trying to integrate components with incompatible interaction
behaviour [10]. Thus if we want to ensure that a component-based system obeys specified behavioural properties, we
must take into account the component interaction behaviour. In this context, the notion of software architecture assumes
a key role since it represents the reference skeleton used to compose components and let them interact. In the software
architecture domain, the interaction among the components is represented by the notion of a software connector.
I This work is an extended version of [P. Inverardi, M. Tivoli, Automatic synthesis of deadlock-free connectors for com/dcom applications, in: ACM
Proceedings of the Joint 8th ESEC and 9th FSE, ACM Press, Vienna, 2001; P. Inverardi M. Tivoli, Deadlock-free software architectures for com/dcom
applications, Elsevier Journal of Systems and Software Special Issue Component-based Software Engineering 65 (3) (2003) 173–183. Journal No.: 7735,
Article No.: 7346; P. Inverardi, M. Tivoli, Software architecture for correct components assembly, in: Formal Methods for the Design of Computer,
Communication and Software Systems: Software Architecture, in: LNCS, vol. 2804, Springer, 2003]. It has been partially supported by Progetto MIUR
SAHARA and by Progetto MURST CNR-SP4. We acknowledge the cooperation of all members of these projects. We also acknowledge Simone Scriboni, who
collaboratedwith us in preliminary research regarding the automatic synthesis of deadlock-free coordinators [P. Inverardi, S. Scriboni, Connectors synthesis
for deadlock-free component-based architectures, in: Proceedings of 16th ASE, Coronado Island, CA, November 2001]. The authors are also grateful to
Patrizio Pelliccione and Marco Autili for their valuable discussions.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 0862433734.
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In this paper, we illustrate our approach to the assembly problem and validate it on an industrial case study that concerns
the development of systems for safeguarding, fruiting, and supporting theCultural Heritage. Our aim is to analyze andprevent
dynamic behavioural problems that can arise from component composition. We propose an architectural “coordinator-
based” approach. The idea is to build applications by assuming a formal architectural model of the system representing the
components to be integrated and the connectors over which the components will communicate [27]. We will consider the
special case of a generic layered architecture in which components can request services of components above them, and
notify components below them.We compose a system in such away that it is possible to check whether the system exhibits
integration failures. We derive in an automatic way, from the COTS (black-box) components, the code that implements
a new component to be inserted in the composed system. This new component implements a software coordinator. The
coordinator mediates the interaction among components in order to prevent possible integration failures.
For the aims of this work, we assume that some specification of the externally “observable” behaviour of each component
(forming the system to be assembled) is available in the form of a Labelled Transition System (LTS) [36]. The rationale
behind this choice is that LTSs constitute a fundamental model of concurrent computation which is widely used in light
of its flexibility and applicability. LTSs are often used as semantic model for many formal languages that are used to model
concurrent systems. Example of these languages are CCS [23], and CSP [34]. Actually, very often, these calculi are formalized
operationally by using an LTS-based semantics [35]. Furthermore, note also that an LTS can be seen not only as a semantic
model but also as a notation for behavioural specification purposes. Thus, in the remainder of the paper, whenwe consider a
set of COTS components, wewill associate to each COTS component an LTS representing the externally observable behaviour
of the component. That is the behaviour of the component in terms of the messages it exchanges with its environment.
In practice, as it is described in [30,39], we assume to deal with the so-called behavioural interfaces. In our context, a
behavioural interface is an augmented IDL file.1 According to “design by contract” approaches [28], we can assume that the
IDL file of a component is augmented, by the component developer, through a commented header. Such a header encodes
somehow (e.g., by using XML) an LTS that models the observable behaviour performed by the component when it interacts
with its expected environment (i.e., this LTS models the component interaction protocol). For a client, such an XML file is
directly provided by the client developer. Note also that, in our context, a component always respects its interaction protocol
specification since it is provided by the developer of the same component, who is aware of the information needed to specify
the component protocol.
In otherworks [17,18]wehave shownhow it is possible to automatically derive these LTS-based behavioural descriptions
by assuming a partial specification of the system to be assembled. This partial specification is given in the form of a
basic Message Sequence Charts (bMSCs) and High Level MSCs (HMSCs) specification [1,32]. The automatic derivation of the
behavioural specification for each component can be performed by applying our implementation of the algorithm described
in [32]. HMSC and bMSC specifications are useful as input language, since they are commonly used in software development
practice. Thus, LTSs can be regarded as an internal specification language.
Moreover, we assume to have a specification of the composed system desired behaviours in the form of LTSs. Under these
two assumptionswehave developed a framework that automatically derives the assembly code (i.e., the coordinator’s actual
code) for a set of components. This code is derived in order to obtain a failure-free system, i.e., a deadlock-free system that
does not violate any specified desired behaviour. A desired behaviour specificationmodels those interactions of components
that are actually needed for the overall purpose of the system.
We have implemented the approach in our SYNTHESIS tool [30,31,39]. We have validated and applied SYNTHESIS for
assembling Microsoft COM/DCOM components [30] and EJB components [39]. The code synthesized by SYNTHESIS refers
either toMicrosoft Visual Studiowith Active Template Library (for COM/DCOM components) or to Eclispewith AspectJ (for EJB
components) as reference development platforms. In this paper, the use of SYNTHESIS is limited to the explanatory example
and the case study used to illustrate the approach. We refer to [30,39] for a detailed presentation of SYNTHESIS at work.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the problem we want to address and
introduce a set of background notions, respectively. In particular, Section 3 is related to the formalism that we use for
modelling our application context. These formalism is LTSs. Section 4 describes and formalizes our reference architectural
style that belongs to layered styles. Section 5 formalizes our method and describes it at work by means of a simple
explanatory example. Section 6 validates ourmethod bymeans of an industrial case study that concerns the development of
systems for safeguarding, fruiting, and supporting the Cultural Heritage. In Section 7 we describe how it is possible to apply
our approach to multi-layered systems. Section 8 proves correctness and completeness properties of the entire method
described in Section 5. It is not critical for the understanding of the approach. Thus, the reader that is not interested in
correctness and completeness properties of the described approach can completely skip it. Section 9 presents relatedworks.
Section 10 summarizes the work and discusses applications and future extensions.
In Appendix, at the end of the paper, we describe the algorithms that are performed by SYNTHESIS to automatically
build a behavioural model of the deadlock-free assembly code (they are also described in [17,18]). These algorithms are
not crucial for the understanding of the approach. However, we kept them in Appendix for those readers interested in the
implementation details of the approach.
1 For components implementing a server logic. On the contrary, for components implementing only a client code there is no IDL and hence only the
additional information (i.e., the component observable behaviour) is taken into account.
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2. Problem description
The problem we want to treat can be phrased as follows: Given a set of interacting components C and a set of behavioural
properties P, automatically derive a deadlock-free assembly A of these componentswhich guarantees every property in P, if possible.
The basic ingredients of this problem are: (i) the type of components that we refer to, (ii) the type of properties that we
want to guarantee and (iii) the type of systems that we want to build. We consider COTS components that are truly black-
box components. For now, each property in P is a functional property expressing precise ways to coordinate the interaction
behaviour of the components forming the system to be assembled. Thus, hereafter, we call them coordination policies. The
assembly A depends on the constraints induced by the architectural model the system is based on. This architectural model,
that defines the rules used to build the composed system, is called CBA (i.e., Coordinator-Based Architecture) style.
Besides assuming that the system architecture must reflect the rules of a well-defined architectural style (namely
the CBA style), we also assume that a behavioural specification of each component is provided in the form of an LTS.
Thus when we say: Given a set of interacting components C in the problem definition we mean that we consider a set of
component behavioural specifications C (i.e., of LTSs). Informally our approach is the following. The method starts with
a set of components, and builds a deadlock-free coordinator following the reference style constraints. Then coordination
policy analysis is performed. If the synthesized deadlock-free coordinator contains policy violating behaviours, a prevention
strategy is applied. Depending on the behaviours specified by the coordination policy, the analysis of only the coordinator
is enough to automatically obtain a version of the system which is deadlock-free and guarantees those behaviours.
Broadly speaking, in order to prevent deadlocks, our method automatically synthesizes a coordinator that preempts all
the component interactions in order not to perform the “execution traces” always leading to deadlocks hence restricting
the set of all possible composed system’s behaviours. In doing so, it cannot be sure that those component interactions that
are actually needed for the overall purpose of the system are still kept. The coordination policy analysis is for this purpose.
That is, each coordination policy is an LTS specification of the component interactions that are required for the purposes of
the system. The coordination policy analysis step of our method further restricts the set of the behaviours exhibited by the
deadlock-free coordinator in order to avoid the component interactions that do not guarantee the specified policies (and,
hence, they are not required for the overall purpose of the system). It might be the case that, by taking into account the set
of components given as input to our method, it is not possible to assemble a deadlock-free system that, in the same time,
guarantees also the specified policies. In this case, since we are dealing with black-box components, there is nothing to do
and our method answers to the user with an unsuccessful output. Otherwise, our method will synthesize a deadlock-free
coordinator that exhibits only the component interactions specified through the coordination policies and that are the ones
required for the purposes of the system. It is worthwhile noticing that the correct composed system (with respect to the
deadlock freedom and the specified coordination policies), has not to be necessarily forced to let the components exhibit all
their possible interactions (as specified by their behavioural interface) but only the ones that are needed for the system’s
purposes.
2.1. Deadlock and beyond
In our context, the deadlock is the base failure because it is directly identifiable in the behavioural model of the
synthesized coordinator. That is, we distinguish the deadlock handling process and the handling of failures different from
deadlocks. However, we might require the user to provide our tool with a specification of the deadlock-free desired
behaviours (of the system to be built) in order to deal with both deadlocks and other different failures bymeans of the same
technique. In spite of this, we maintain a special handling of deadlock freedom because we do not want to force the user to
provide such a specification. This is a reasonable choice since for large systems deadlocks are very often unpredictable and
hence their detection and prevention is required to be as automatic as possible without involving the user in the detection
and prevention process.
We give the following definition to describe the deadlock problem in a component-based context.
Definition 1 (Deadlock). A set of components is deadlocked if each component in the set is waiting for an event that only a
different component in the set can cause.
Informally we can say that in component-based architectures, there are two types of deadlock problems:
• observable deadlocks;
• hidden deadlocks.
For both kinds of deadlock, the behaviour of a component is wrong with respect to the behaviour of its “environment”
although the component behaviour is “correct” in a stand-alone context. Moreover, the deadlock occurs during the
interaction among a component and its environment. The difference between these two kinds of deadlock is that for the
first one the failure is an event that is observable by the component environment. For the second class the failure is an
externally non-observable event since it might depend on internal characteristics of the component.
Thus while observable deadlocks can be treated in the component setting by operating on the architectural context,
namely on the coordinator, the hidden deadlocks cannot be automatically addressed. The only way to solve the problem
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is to modify the internal behaviour of a component. This is not possible with black-box components. An example for this
deadlock type is offered by the Compressing Proxyproblem [8]. For these reasons,we focus only on the first class of problems,
attempting to create coordinators that can prevent observable deadlocks. In the remainder of the paper we use the term
deadlock to mean an observable deadlock.
In our approach we also consider the analysis of failures beyond deadlock. As mentioned in Sections 1 and 2, to do
it, we specify a set of component interactions that are needed for the overall purpose of the system. As done previously,
we call them “coordination policies” or “desired behaviours” since they represents, among all possible composed system
behaviours, only the ones that we wish the composed system will satisfy. Obviously, the user can specify a desired
behaviour that is always violated by the composed system. In this case, our tool will answer to the user that this behaviour
cannot be satisfied and, probably, something in the specification has to be changed. We recall that each desired behaviour
represents a coordination policy (for the interaction of the components in the system to be assembled) which is given in
terms of an LTS. In the composed system that we want to build, in order to progress in the execution, a component has
to perform actions according to the policy. In other words, a coordination policy can be seen as an abstract and high-
level specification of a new component (i.e., the coordinator that we want to build automatically) that serves as desired2
environment for the components given as input to our method. Furthermore, the system composed by the components and
the desired environment (i.e., the coordinator) is built according to a precise software architecture, i.e., the components
cannot communicate with each other directly but they are all connected to the coordinator and indirectly communicate
with each other only through the coordinator.
3. Labelled transition systems
In this section we provide the background needed to understand the approach presented in this paper. We summarize
the relevant definitions regarding the notation that is used to specify the externally observable behaviour of a component
and the coordination policies that are required for the realization of the system’s purposes. This notation concerns LTSs [36].
It allows us to rigorously define the semantics of the interaction behaviour of a component with its environment and of the
composed system’s behaviour (by means of the LTS parallel composition operator, see Definition 8). Let Act be the universal
set of observable actions, and Actτ = Act ∪ {τ}, where τ denotes an internal action that is not observable to a component’s
environment.
Definition 2 (LTS). An LTS L is a quadruple (S, T,D, s0), where S is a set of states, T ⊆ Actτ is a set of transition labels (i.e.,
actions) called the alphabet of L, D ⊆ S × T × S is the transition relation and s0 ∈ S is the initial state. A LTS is finite if D is
finite, is empty if D is empty. We will make use of the following notation: g α−→ h ⇐⇒ (g,α, h) ∈ D.
An LTS L = (S, T,D, s0) is non-deterministic if ∃(s, a, s′), (s, a, s′′) ∈ D : s′ 6= s′′, otherwise L is deterministic. It is worthwhile
mentioning that the SYNTHESIS tool deals with both deterministic and non-deterministic LTSs hence letting to the user
the flexibility of modelling the behaviour of a component by means of either a deterministic or, when needed, a non-
deterministic LTS.
Wewill refer to sink states of an LTS as deadlock states. A deadlock statemodels the fact that a safety violation has occurred
in the associated component/system. We also denote as deadlock-free all LTSs that do not have deadlock states.
Definition 3 (Deadlock State). Let L= (S, T,D, s0) be an LTS, a v ∈ S is a deadlock state of L if and only if @v′ ∈ S : v−→ v′.
Definition 4 (Trace). Let L = (S, T,D, s0) be an LTS, a trace of L is a t ∈ (T∗ ∪ {}) defined in such a way that t =  ∨
∃n > 0, s0, . . . , sn ∈ S : t = µ1µ2 . . .µn ∧ s0 µ1−→· · · µn−→ sn, where  denotes the so called empty trace.
The set of traces of an LTS L is denoted as Tr(L). Given a trace t = τ∗α1τ∗ . . . τ∗αmτ∗ we will say that the normalized version
of t is the trace α1 . . .αm. Note that the normalized version of τ∗ is the empty trace . Given the set of traces Tr(L) of an LTS
L, we denote the corresponding set of normalized traces as Tr(L)τ .
Definition 5 (Deadlock Trace). Let L = (S, T,D, s0) be an LTS, a t ∈ Tr(L) is a deadlock trace of L if and only if (t 6= ) ∧
(∃n > 0, sn−1, sn ∈ S : t = µ1µ2 . . .µn ∧ sn−1 µn−→ sn) where sn is a deadlock state.
We denote as errTr(L) the set of deadlock traces of an LTS L. In other words, they are all the traces leading to a deadlock state
(i.e., a sink).
Definition 6 (Relabelling Function). Let L = (S, T,D, s0) be an LTS, a fi :LTS−→LTS (for some i ∈ N ) is a relabelling function
for L if and only if L[fi] = (S, T ′,D′, s0) where:
• T ′ = {α_i | α ∈ T} ∪ {τ | τ ∈ T}
• D′ = {(s,α_i, s′) | α 6= τ ∧ (s,α, s′) ∈ D} ∪ {(v, τ, v′) | (v, τ, v′) ∈ D}.
2 It is desired with respect to the overall purpose of the system.
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Definition 7 (Projection). Let L = (S, T,D, s0) be an LTS, let A be an alphabet, the projection of L on A is the LTS L • A =
(S, T ′′,D′′, s0) where:
• T ′′ = {α | α ∈ T ∧ α ∈ A} ∪ {τ}
• D′′ = {(s,α, s′) | (s,α, s′) ∈ D ∧ α ∈ A} ∪ {(s, τ, s′) | (s,β, s′) ∈ D ∧ β /∈ A}.
We model the externally observable behaviour of a component Ci by means of an LTS modelling the interaction of Ci with
its expected environment. LTSs can be used to define finite state systems [29]. For our purposes we will in the following
assume that all systems we will deal with are finite state.
Note that, in our context, this is not a restriction. We are dealing with black-box components, each of them exporting
through its interface a finite number of operations. In our model, each operation of a component interface can be seen
as a point of interaction of the component with its expected environment (e.g., an observable action in an automaton). If
we would model all the possible externally observable component interactions with an automaton, what matters about
a particular component interaction is not whether it drives the automaton in an accepting state (since we cannot detect
this due to the black-box nature of the component) but whether the automaton is able to perform the corresponding
sequence of actions interactively. Thus, we should consider an automaton in which every state is an accepting state [23,
24] (i.e., an LTS). A consequence is that if an automaton accepts a particular component interaction seen as a sequence
of component interface operation invocations (i.e., a trace of actions in our model), then it also accepts any initial part of
that interaction/sequence. In other words, due to the finiteness of the set of component interface operations, although all
the possible component interactions can be infinite, we can always finitely represent them since the language built over
the component interface operations (i.e., the model of the component interaction behaviour) is prefix-closed [24]. Prefix-
closed languages are generated by prefix-grammars that describe exactly all regular languages. It is well-known that regular
languages are always accepted by finite-state automata. Thus, due to our component interaction model and to the fact that
we deal with black-box components,3 for us, it is sufficient to consider finite state systems for dealing with all the systems
we are interested in.
In order to model component-based systems, LTSs can be combined using the LTS parallel composition operator. In
the literature, several variants of the operator have been defined. The one used here (see Definition 8) has an interleaving
semantics. That is, if α is an observable action (i.e., α 6= τ) of an LTS Li, then α synchronizes with the complementary action α
of an LTS Lj (with i 6= j) producing an internal action τ at the level of the parallel composition. Synchronization of actions is
thus determined by the alphabets of the component LTSs. An action β of an LTS Li for which no complementary action exists
in an LTS Lj (with i 6= j), is executed only by Li, hence, producing the same action β at the level of the parallel composition (β
is a so-called “non-shared” action). Analogously, the internal action τ is executed by exactly one component LTS at a time.
Hereafter, we will interchangeably use the terms “complementary action” and “co-action”. In the following we formally
define the parallel composition of LTSs. For the sake of clarity, we give the formal definition by considering only two LTSs.
In Appendix we give the same definition by considering the general case of more than two LTSs.
Definition 8 (Parallel Composition). Let L1 = (S1, T1,D1, s10), and L2 = (S2, T2,D2, s20) be two LTSs, their parallel composition
is the LTS L1 | L2 = (S, T,D, s0) where:
• States: S ⊆ S1 × S2
• Root: s0 = (s10, s20)• Labels: T = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ {τ}
• Synchronization: ((s1, s2), τ, (s′1, s′2)) ∈ D ⇐⇒ ∃ α,α ∈ T1 ∪ T2 : (s1,α, s′1) ∈ D1 ∧ (s2,α, s′2) ∈ D2 ∧ α 6= τ• Interleaving: ((s1, s2),β, (s′1, s2)) ∈ D ⇐⇒ ∃ β ∈ (T1 \ T2) ∪ {τ} : (s1,β, s′1) ∈ D1• Reachability: ∀s ∈ S : ∃µ ∈ T∗ : µ is a trace leading to s.
In practice, the parallel composition operator “|” combines the behaviours of two LTSs by synchronizing their
shared/common actions and interleaving their non-shared and internal actions. The part of the parallel composition that
is not reachable from the initial state is ignored, as it has no semantic significance. Note that “Interleaving” has a symmetric
version that is not given since its definition is trivial.
4. The CBA reference architectural style
In this sectionwedefine the reference architectural style that represents the starting point of ourwork. This style imposes
constraints on the architecture of the system to be assembled that allow us to automatically derive, from a set of component
specifications, a behavioural model of the environment expected by the components (i.e., in our setting, the coordinator).
As we will see in Section 5.2, this model plays a key role in synthesizing the deadlock-free assembly A (of our problem
description) in such a way that it guarantees the specified policies.
According to [27], we define an architectural style as a set of constraints on a software architecture that identify a class
of architectures with similar features. A software architectural style is determined by the following:
3 That is, from an external point of view, we can only observe the component interaction protocol as amessage exchangewithout being able to predicate
about the content of the exchanged data/messages.
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Fig. 1. A sample of a CFA and of a CBA.
• a set of component types that perform some function at runtime;
• a topological layout of these components indicating their runtime interrelationships;
• a set of syntactic and topological constraints;
• a set of connectors that mediate communication, coordination or cooperation among components.
Under the architectural style classification in [27] the reference architectural style we use in this paper belongs to layered
systems.
Our reference architectural style is derived fromC2 [27]. It consists of components and connectors plus a set of constraints
dictating how they may be legally composed.
We assume each component has a top and bottom interface. Top (bottom) interfaces are points of interaction and they
define the set of messages (i.e., of request and/or notification type) that can be exchanged with a component or connector
above (below). Connectors between components are synchronous communication channels defining a top and bottom
interface too. The top (bottom) interface of a component may be connected to the bottom (top) interface of one or more
connectors.
Components communicate by passing two types of messages: notifications and requests. A notification is sent downward,
while a request is sent upward. As usual, components implement the system functionality, and they are the primary
computational constituents of a system (typically implemented as COTS components). As already said in Section 1 the aim of
our approach is to automatically derive, from the COTS components, the code that implements a new component to insert
in the composed system. This new component implements a software coordinator. A software coordinator mediates the
interaction among components in order to prevent possible integration failures. Hereafter, we will refer to it as coordinator
component or simply coordinator and to a component that is not a coordinator as component. Coordinator components, in
our style, do not have an unconstrained input/output behaviour (as it is the case of components). In fact, they simply route
messages (sent or received by other components) and each input they receive is strictly followed by a corresponding output,
i.e., they have a strictly sequential input/output behaviour. Coordinators are introduced as a means to act on the original
composed system4 integration and communication behaviour.
Within this architectural style, we will refer to a system as a Coordinator-Free Architecture (CFA) if it is defined without
any coordinator. Conversely, a system in which coordinators appear is termed a Coordinator-Based Architecture (CBA) and is
defined as a set of components directly connected to one or more coordinators, through connectors, in a synchronous way.
Fig. 1 illustrates a CFA (left-hand side) and a CBA (right-hand side). C1, . . . , C7 are components; K is a coordinator. Each
line between two components is a connector.
In contrast to C2 where:
• both synchronous and asynchronous communication is possible;
• coordinators might perform message filtering;
• coordinators have an unconstrained input/output behaviour;
in our style:
• only synchronous messages can be exchanged;
• a coordinator is only a routing devices without any filtering policy;
• a coordinator performs a strictly sequential input/output behaviour.
We have introduced the first constraint because the deadlock is a typical problem that occurs in synchronous systems.
This is not a limitation because it is well-known that with the introduction of a buffer component we can always simulate
an asynchronous system by a synchronous one [23]. We have introduced the second constraint because in order to apply
our methodology without human intervention we have to make assumptions on the behaviour of the coordinator. The last
constraint introduces a precise (i.e., a strictly sequential one) input/output structure in the coordinator. The aim of this
constraint is to make the coordinator behave as a reactive component.
Sincewe are assuming a synchronous communication, input and output actions, that are common to the components, are
considered to be blocking actions. The other actions can be performed autonomously. Thus, component behaviour will be
described as LTSs and system configuration will be specified using the LTS parallel composition operator (see Definition 8).
4 The system built in an uncontrolled way, i.e., by assembling the usual components together (through connectors) without using any coordinator.
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To define the behaviour of a composition of components, we simply place in parallel the LTS descriptions of those
components. In this way, the components (in the parallel composition) synchronize only on “complementary” common
actions. In other words, if a component Ci is going to perform an action α its only way to progress is to synchronize with
some component Cj (i 6= j), which is going to perform the action α, unless either α is an action only of Ci or it is an internal
action. This gives a CFA for a set of components.
Given a CFA for a set of components, we can also produce a corresponding CBA for these components by automatically
deriving and interposing a “no-op” coordinator between communicating components. The coordinator at this point (i.e., the
no-op one) simply passes events between communicating components (as we will see later the no-op coordinator will play
a key role in restricting the system interaction behaviour to a subset of deadlock-free and specified desired behaviours).
Definition 9 (CFA). A Coordinator-Free Architecture (CFA) is a set of components directly connected, through connectors, in
a synchronous way.
Definition 10 (CBA). A Coordinator-Based Architecture (CBA) is a set of components directly connected to one or more
coordinators, through connectors, in a synchronous way.
Given n components (i.e., n component LTSs) AC1, . . . , ACn, we will formalize a CFA system as follows:
CFA = (AC1 | . . . | ACn).
The corresponding CBA system that our method will generate can be modelled as:
CBA = (AC1[f1] | . . . | ACn[fn] | K),
where K is the LTSmodelling the behaviour of the coordinator that is automatically generated by ourmethod.We recall that
for all i = 1, . . . , n, fi are relabelling functions and ACi[fi] are the corresponding relabelled LTSs (see Definition 6). Relabelling
functions model the wrapping and deployment mechanisms that are used, in the practice, to interpose the coordinator
component among the other components in the system [30].
Although the CBA style is a generic layered style, for the sake of presentation we will only deal with single-layer systems
(e.g., standard client–server architectures in COM/DCOM). We provide the foundations to deal with multi-layered systems
in Section 7.
5. Method description
In this section we formalize and describe our method by using an explanatory example. As illustrated in Fig. 2 we
proceed in three steps. The first step starts with a CFA system and automatically produces, obeying our CBA style, a new
configuration with the same components plus a no-op coordinator. Although this new configuration contains a coordinator,
under a suitable notion of equivalence, it behaves equivalently to the CFA configuration. That is, the no-op coordinator is
automatically derived to model all possible interactions of components. Although it plays a key role for the execution of the
second and third steps, at this point, it is a simple delegator of the requests (notifications) performed by the components
below (above) it towards the components above (below) it.
The second step performs deadlock analysis on the CBA system to detect deadlocks. Subsequently, we can operate on the
no-op coordinator in order to obtain a deadlock-free equivalent system, which prevents the detected deadlocks.
The third step concerns the problem of guaranteeing the coordination policies against the model of the deadlock-free
coordinator. This step produces the policy-satisfying coordinator representing the failure-free composition code for the
components forming the composed system. That is, the synthesized coordinator represents the deadlock-free composition
code that guarantees all those component interactions that are needed for the overall purpose of the system. Note that
although in principle we could carry on the three steps together we decided to keep them separate. This has been done to
support internal data structures’ traceability.
In the following sections we formalize and describe our approach.
5.1. Explanatory example
The explanatory example that we use in this paper to better describe and illustrate the formalization of ourmethodology
is concerned with the automatic assembly of a client–server component-based system. This system is formed by three
components: two clients, respectively denoted as C1 and C2, and one server denoted as C3. This example, although very
simple, exhibits coordination problems that exemplify the kind of problems our methodology can solve. These are typically
due to the presence of race conditions in accessing shared resources.
By continuing the description of the example and by referring to the method depicted in Fig. 2, we want to assemble
a system formed by C1, C2, and C3. In doing so, we want to automatically prevent possible deadlocks and guarantee the
specified coordination policies, hence, guaranteeing that the system’s purposes are satisfied.
Fig. 3 represents the component structure of the CFA system and the behaviour of each component in terms of an LTS.
The LTSs, shown in Fig. 3, have been drawn by using the SYNTHESIS tool. Each LTS models the component observable
behaviour in an intuitive way. Each state of an LTS represents a state of the component and the state S0 represents its initial
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Fig. 2. 3-step method.
Fig. 3. Components structure and behaviours of the working example.
state. By abusing notation, hereafter, we will interchangeably use the terms “state” and “node”. Each action or co-action
performed by interacting with the environment of the component (i.e., all other components in parallel) is represented as a
label of a transition into a new state. By referring to our reference architectural style (see Section 4), actions and co-actions
can be requests or notifications. Requests and notifications can bemodelled as input/output actions of a component. Within
an LTS of a component, the label of an input action is prefixed by the question mark “?” (e.g., ?C3.retValue1 of C1). The
label of an output action is prefixed by the exclamation mark “!” (e.g., !C3.method2 of C2). In the case of our example,
input (resp., output) actions of the clients are notifications (resp., requests). For the server, input (resp., output) actions are
requests (resp., notifications).
The interface of server C3 exports three methods denoted as C3.method1, C3.method2, and C3.method3,
respectively. While C3.method2 has no return value, C3.method1 and C3.method3 can return some value.
C3.method1 returns two possible return values denoted asC3.retValue1, andC3.retValue2. The former is returned
when a call of C3.method1 has not preceded by a call of C3.method2. Otherwise, the latter is returned. C3.method3
returns only one value, i.e., C3.retValue2. The two clients perform method calls according to the server interface.
Indeed, since we want to deal with either reusable black-box components or COTS components, there might not be a
direct syntactical correspondence between the action labels used by the different component LTSs. In general, this kind of
mismatch cannot be solved automatically and it requires to develop (by hand) component wrappers solving that syntactical
mismatch, as done in thework described in [3,30]. Since in thisworkwe are focusing on automatically preventing interaction
protocol mismatches, we consider this problem out of the scope of this paper and, hereafter, we will assume that the
component interfaces syntactically match since either they already match or suitable component wrappers have been
previously developed by the system assembler (i.e., a possible user of the SYNTHESIS tool).
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In the literature, semi-automatic approaches for automatically solving mismatches at the level of the interface’s syntax
can be found [5,33,37]. They use LTSs and a means to define syntactical correspondences [5,33], e.g., a set of synchronous
vectors [37,38] that is assumed to be given as input to the approach. The knowledge that is required to give synchronous
vectors or, in general, syntactical mappings as input is the same as the one required to develop a suitable component
wrapper. Thus, the previously considered assumption is not a limitation of our work with respect to the work described
in [5,33,37].
In the following sections we formalize our method illustrating it by means of the explanatory working example
introduced above.
5.2. Method formalization
For defining a suitable LTS encoding within the SYNTHESIS tool we define the Actual Behaviour Graph (AC-Graph) which
is the first basic structure we use in the framework. The term actual emphasizes the difference between the component
behaviour and the intended, or assumed, behaviour of the environment.
Definition 11 (AC-Graph). Let L = (S, T,D, s0) be the LTS of a component C, the corresponding Actual Behaviour Graph
(AC-Graph) AC is an LTS of the form (S, T ′,D, s0) where T ′ is the set of arc labels such that:
T ′ = {?α,α ∈ T} ∪ {!α,α ∈ T} ∪ {tau, τ ∈ T}.
An AC-Graph is an LTS with a specific textual syntax for its actions/co-actions, i.e., the way SYNTHESIS implements LTSs.
The point of using them is just to clearly introduce the syntax SYNTHESIS uses for its implementation of LTSs, and hence
the syntax we will use hereafter in the paper. Thus, all definitions regarding LTSs that we have given in Section 3 (i.e.,
Definitions 2–8) directly regard also AC-Graphs. It is worthwhile noticing that !α denotes a co-action α and ?α denotes an
action α. Thus, hereafter, we extend the action complement operator of LTSs [36] to actions whose labels are prefixed by ’?’ or
’!’. This is done by considering !α =?α and ?α =!α. By abusing notation, we also extend such an operator to sets of transition
labels, traces, and set of traces as follows: let T ⊆ Actτ be a set of transition labels, then T = {α | α ∈ T} ∪ {τ | τ ∈ T}; let
t = β1 . . .βm be a trace, then t = β1 . . .βm; for the empty trace  we consider  = ; let L = (S, T,D, s0) be an LTS and let
Tr(L) = {t | t ∈ (T∗ ∪ {})}, then Tr(L) = {t | t ∈ Tr(L)}.
Note that the three component LTSs drawn using SYNTHESIS and shown in Fig. 3 are the AC-Graphs of the components
of our working example. For the purposes of the work described in this paper, we assume (without loss of generality) that
a component AC-Graph is always deadlock-free.
Now,wewish to automatically derive from the components’ behaviour (modelled bymeans of an AC-Graph, one for each
component) the requirements on their environment that guarantee a deadlock-free interaction. A system is in deadlock
when it cannot perform any computation. In our setting, deadlock means that all components are blocked waiting for an
action from the environment that is not possible. Thus, a first requirement is that if a component has reached a state inwhich
it performs an input (resp., output) action ?α (resp., !α), its environment has to have reached a state in which it performs !α
(resp., ?α). Furthermore, in the architectural style that we have chosen (i.e., CBA), the environment of the component can
be represented only by one or more coordinators. We recall that the coordinator performs strictly sequential input/output
operations only. Thus if it receives an input ?α from a component (that performs !α) it will then immediately output the
received input message (i.e., it will perform !α) towards a destination component (that, in turn, performs ?α). Analogously,
if the coordinator outputs a message, this means that, immediately before, it received that message as input from a source
component. Intuitively, in a CBA, if there are two components ACi and ACj respectively performing !α and ?α from their
respective current states, the no-op coordinator K (at its current state) performs ?α_i followed by !α_j, since ACi[fi] and ACj[fj]
in the CBA model (see Definition 10) would perform !α_i and ?α_j, respectively.
In other words, if a component ACi outputs a message α (i.e., it performs !α_i) the coordinator gets in input that message
hence performing ?α_i (the symmetric case is analogous). The coordinator is the component’s environment and hence it
has a behaviour that is symmetric (i.e., complementary) with respect to the component behaviour. That is, if a component
performs an output then the coordinator performs an input and vice versa.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the coordinator does not preempt non-observable actions of a component
(i.e., τ actions) since they are component internal actions. Analogously, it does not preempt non-shared actions (form the
coordinator point of view, they can be considered as a kind of internal actions since they do not concern the interactionwith
the environment actualized at assembly-time).
The following definition formalizes the characterizing properties of a no-op coordinator AC-Graph.
Definition 12 (No-op Coordinator AC-Graph). Let AC1 = (S1, T1,D1, s10), . . . , ACn = (Sn, Tn,Dn, sn0) be n component AC-
Graphs, their no-op coordinator AC-Graph is the AC-Graph Kno-op = (S, T,D, s0) where:
• States: S ⊆ S1 × · · · × Sn
• Root: s0 = (s10, . . . , sn0)• Labels: T = ⋃ni=1 Ti[fi]• Strictly I/O behaviour: ((s1, . . . , sn), ?α_i, (s′1, . . . , s′n)),
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Fig. 4. Automatically synthesized no-op coordinator AC-Graph.
((s′1, . . . , s′n), !α_j, (s′′1, . . . , s′′n)) ∈ D ⇐⇒ ∃i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : i 6= j ∧ (si, !α, s′i) ∈ Di ∧ (sj, ?α, s′′j ) ∈ Dj ∧ ∀ k, h ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
k 6= i ∧ h 6= jH⇒ s′k = sk ∧ s′′h = s′h
• Reachability: ∀s ∈ S : ∃µ ∈ T∗ : µ is a trace leading to s.
The property “Strictly I/O behaviour” states that the no-op coordinator is synthesized in such a way that each input
it receives is strictly followed by a corresponding output. The property “Reachability” simply states that each state
of the synthesized no-op coordinator is reachable from the initial state. The other properties do not need further
comments.
In our previous work [17,18], we have described the algorithm that is used to automatically create the no-op coordinator
AC-Graph, from the component AC-Graphs. This algorithm makes use of graph structures beyond AC-Graphs (i.e., the so-
called EX-Graphs) and of a unification technique over first-order terms [21]. The no-op coordinator synthesis is actually
based on the unification of the component EX-Graphs [17,18]. An EX-Graph represents the behaviour that a single
component expects from the no-op coordinator (i.e., it is a partial view of the no-op coordinator to be created and it is partial
since it reflects the expectation of a single component). Each component has only its partial view of the no-op coordinator
behaviour, by unifying all components views we can synthesize the no-op coordinator global behaviour. In Appendix, at
the end of this paper, we report the algorithms performed by SYNTHESIS to automatically generate the model of the no-
op and the deadlock-free coordinator. We refer to [17,18] for further details on the creation algorithm for both the no-op
coordinator and the deadlock-free one. For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to say that once the no-op coordinator
AC-Graphhas been automatically created its characterizing properties are the ones listed inDefinition 12. It isworth noticing
that an empty coordinator AC-Graph can be obtained. In this case, a coordinator for the set of components given as input
to our method does not exist. That is, the components’ interaction always deadlocks and, hence, dealing with black-box
components, there is no way to prevent the problem.
In Fig. 4, we show a screen-shot of our SYNTHESIS tool illustrating the no-op coordinator AC-Graph automatically
generated from the component AC-Graphs of ourworking example (shown in Fig. 3). By referring to Definition 12, SYNTHESIS
associates to each coordinator AC-Graph’s state an ordered tuple of component AC-Graph states. It is worthwhile noticing
that this is done only internally. In fact, externally, SYNTHESIS denotes the ith generated state as Si (see Fig. 4). Moreover,
as it is shown in Fig. 4, SYNTHESIS denotes as filled states both the deadlock states (see Definition 3), e.g., the state S9,
and the states that can only lead to a deadlock state, e.g., the state S8. Note that if we remove a deadlock state and all
its incoming transitions, all the states from which it was possible to reach only that deadlock state in one step transition
become deadlock states as well. By filling deadlock states and the ones that can only lead to them, deadlock traces
(see Definition 5) can be easily discovered also by the user. For instance, the trace ?C3.method2_2 !C3.method2_3
?C3.method1_1 !C3.method1_3 is a possible deadlock trace5 of the no-op coordinator AC-Graph of our explanatory
example.
Deadlocks occur because of a race condition amongC1 andC2. In fact, one client (i.e.,C2) performs a call ofC3.method2
(see the sequence of transitions from the state S0 to S4 in Fig. 4), hence leading the server C3 in a state in which it expects
a call of C3.method1. While C2 is attempting to perform the call of C3.method1, the other client (i.e., C1) performs such
a call (see the sequence of transitions from S4 to S9). In this scenario C1, C2, and C3 are in the state S1, S1, and S3 of
their AC-Graphs, respectively (see the bottom side of Fig. 3). Now, C3 expects to return C3.retValue2 as return value
of C3.method1 but C2 is still waiting to perform a call of C3.method1 and C1 expects a different return value. Thus, a
behavioural mismatch occurs and it results in a deadlock state in the no-op coordinator AC-Graph.
5 It is the shortest one.
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Fig. 5.Maximal deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph.
5.3. Deadlock detection and prevention
In Section 2 we divided the kinds of deadlock that can occur in our context in two: observable deadlocks and hidden
deadlocks. We recall that we can focus only on deadlocks of the first class due to the different nature of these two kinds of
deadlock.
In this section we present our technique to detect possible deadlocks and to prevent them. By referring to Definitions 3
and 5, deadlocks can be prevented by directly operating on the structure of the no-op coordinator AC-Graph. If deadlocks
exist we can find them by performing an analysis of the no-op coordinator AC-Graph in order to discover its possible
deadlock traces. By continuing our explanatory example,we already said that the trace?C3.method2_2!C3.method2_3
?C3.method1_1 !C3.method1_3 is a deadlock trace of the LTS shown in Fig. 4. In general, to prevent the deadlocks that
have been detected as deadlock states of an LTS L, our SYNTHESIS tool performs backwards error propagation [12] in order to
derive, from L, the LTS L′ in such a way that Tr(L′) = Tr(L) \ errTr(L). In Appendix, at the end of this paper, we formalized the
algorithm used to prunes all possible deadlock traces of the no-op coordinator AC-Graph in order to automatically build the
model of the deadlock-free coordinator.
The following definition formalizes the characterizing properties of a deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph.
Definition 13 (Deadlock-Free Coordinator AC-Graph). Let Kno-op = (S, T,D, s0) be a no-op coordinator AC-Graph, Kdf =
(S′, T ′,D′, s0) is a corresponding deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph if the following properties hold:
• States: S′ ⊆ S
• Labels: T ′ ⊆ T
• Transitions: D′ ⊆ D
• Deadlock-freedom: ∀s ∈ S′ : ∃s′ ∈ S′, x ∈ T ′ : (s, x, s′) ∈ D′.
“States”, “labels”, and “Transitions” are trivial properties. The property “Deadlock-freedom” states that each state of a
deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph has a successor and, hence, it does not lead to a state from which states without
successors can be reached, i.e., a deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph has no deadlock states.
Note that given a no-op coordinator AC-Graph, the corresponding deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph is not unique.
For the purposes of the work described in this paper, our SYNTHESIS tool generates the maximal deadlock-free coordinator
AC-Graph with respect to the cardinality of D, i.e., in our context, it derives the most permissive deadlock-free coordinator.
By continuing our explanatory example, this means that our algorithm for ensuring deadlock-freedom [17,18] (reported in
Appendix) prunes the two transitions from S4 to S9, and their source/target states except for S4 that is kept in the set of
states.
We refer to [17,18] (or toAppendix) for a formal description of our deadlock prevention algorithm. For the purposes of this
paper it is sufficient to say that, by using SYNTHESIS, once the deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph has been automatically
built it satisfies property “Deadlock-freedom” and it is the maximal one. Notice that the deadlock prevention step might
lead to an empty coordinator AC-Graph. In this case, a deadlock-free coordinator for the set of components given as input
to our method does not exist and the SYNTHESIS’s user is informed about that.
In Fig. 5we show themaximal deadlock-free coordinator’s AC-Graphof our explanatory example automatically generated
by SYNTHESIS.
By referring to Fig. 5, from the state S4 the action ?C3.method1_1 (i.e., the method1 request performed by the client
C1 towards the server C3) has been “disabled” since it led to a deadlock. Consistently to the rules of our CBA style and to
its formalization (see Section 4), for ?C3.method1_1, being disabled means that the LTS C2[f2] (that has a transition
labelled with !C3.method1_1) is not able to synchronize with the coordinator AC-Graph on the action ?C3.method1_1
and from the (global) state S4. This means that for the set of component given as input to our method, the only (and most
permissive) way to compose them in order to prevent possible deadlocks is to disable, for this particular case, the request
of C3.method1 whenever the coordinator’s execution is in the state S4. That is, the deadlock-free composed system will
not exhibit that specific interaction. Although it is not the case for our explanatory example, in general, it might happen
that some specific component interactions can be disabled forever (i.e., for every state of the coordinator). This might shock
the component developer but it is not the same for the system assembler. It is worth mentioning that our work should be
intended from the system assembler perspective and not from the component developer perspective. That is, the main goal
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is to build component-based systems as automatic as possible and, following the Component-Based Software Engineering
vision [28], by stressing a reuse-based approach according to the Brooks’ “buy, don’t build” philosophy [40]. Thus, in this
scenario, the system assembler is looking for a set of components that “together” can provide the functionality specified
for the system to be built (i.e., the coordination policies). It might be the case that the components also provide more than
what is required (if they provide less, there is nothing to do and the composed system cannot be built by composing that
components). The important thing for the system assembler is to reuse the acquired components and keep only the specified
desired behaviours although it might be the case of “under-using” some component. Thus, after deadlock prevention, a
further step is required and it concerns the step of guaranteeing the coordination policies (as described in Section 5.4).
At the level of the coordinator’s actual code, the coordinator is amulti-threaded component that creates a thread for each
request and for each caller performing such a request. Removing deadlock traces corresponds to put in a waiting state the
thread that handles the request leading to the deadlock state and performed by the identified caller. Thus the coordinator
will return, again, the control to the caller, for that request, only when it reaches a state in which the blocked request is
allowable.6 Such multi-threaded servers are supported by existing component technologies such as COM/DCOM or CORBA.
Since this implementation is correctly reflected by our LTS modelling, hereafter, we will only be focused on the effects that
our approach has on the coordinator’s behavioural model (i.e., its AC-Graph) and we refer to [30,39] for implementation
details concerning the coordinator’s actual code.
5.4. Generic coordination failures detection and prevention
Our approach also considers the analysis of failures beyond deadlock. The specification of these failures is provided in
terms of precise ways to coordinate the components forming the composed system, which are focused on preventing such
failures or, in other words, on guaranteeing the system’s purposes. Each coordination policy is given in terms of an LTS.
In this section we formalize the third step of the method shown in Fig. 2. This step concerns the problem of guaranteeing
the coordination policies against the deadlock-free coordinator’s AC-Graph. Moreover, by continuing our explanatory
example, we also apply our technique to the synthesized deadlock-free coordinator shown in Fig. 5.
In particular, in Section 5.4.1, we informally introduce the step of guaranteeing a policy and formalize our LTS-based
notation for the specification of coordination policies, by also using it to specify a possible policy for our explanatory
example. In Section 5.4.2 we formalizes our step of guaranteeing a policy by providing a formal definition for the failure-
free coordinator AC-Graph, andwe apply it to our explanatory example. In Section 5.4.3 we evaluate our coordination policy
specification notation with respect to property specification notations commonly used in the software verification domain,
e.g., Linear-Time Temporal Logic (LTL) [44,45].
5.4.1. Generic coordination failures specification
The problem we want to treat can be informally rephrased as follows: Given a set of interacting components C and a set of
coordination policies P that describes precise ways to coordinate the interaction behaviour of the components in C, automatically
derive a deadlock-free assembly A of these components that guarantees any policy in P, if possible. Thus the coordination policies
that must be guaranteed are related to the interaction behaviour of the components forming the system to be built (through
the addition of the coordinator). They represent those component interactions that are needed for the overall purpose of the
composed system. The components interactions that do not reflect the ones specified by the coordination policies represent
behavioural failures of the system because they do not guarantee its overall purpose. Thus, the set of components given as
input to ourmethod is taken into account for coordination policy specification purposes.Whereas the synthesized deadlock-
free coordinator is taken into account for guaranteeing a coordination policy. In fact, analogously to deadlock, we cannot
prevent behavioural failures of the CBA-system that are not identifiablewith precise behaviours of the synthesized deadlock-
free coordinator. A coordinator behaviour ismodelled as a trace in the coordinator’s AC-Graph. Thus the coordination policies
we deal with are behaviours that might correspond to possible traces of the coordinator’s AC-Graph. Since a coordinator AC-
Graph trace corresponds to a sequence of component AC-Graph actions, one can specify a coordination policy by looking
only at the alphabet of the components AC-Graph given as input.
We recall that each coordination policy is specified in terms of an LTS. In particular, for the purposes of our method, the
LTS that models a coordination policy is an AC-Graph called coordination policy AC-Graph. It will always be a deadlock-free
AC-Graph. It has a syntax for the action labels expressive enough tomodel regular (i.e., specific), negative (i.e., all possible but
one), universal (i.e., all possible) actions, logical “AND” — composition of negative actions, and logical “OR” — composition
of regular actions.
To guarantee a coordination policy on the composed system interactions, our method restricts the behaviours of the
deadlock-free coordinator in order to keep only those behaviours specified by the policy hence obtaining a failure-free
coordinator.
Informally, firstly, a trace containment check [23] between the policy AC-Graph P and the deadlock-free coordinator AC-
Graph Kdf is performed. If the set of traces of P is contained (under a suitable notion of trace containment) in the set of traces
6 Meaning that, this time, that request performed from that caller does not lead to a deadlock state.
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of Kdf , then guaranteeing P is possible since the components, among other functionalities, provide also the functionality
required for the overall purpose of the system. Otherwise, as already said in Section 5.3, the components given as input to
our method do not provide the desired functionality and, dealing with black-box components, there is nothing to do. In this
case, the SYNTHESIS’s user is notified with an unsuccessful answer.
If the containment check successfully terminates, a kind of synchronous product [36,38] between the deadlock-free
coordinator AC-Graph and the coordination policy AC-Graph is performed, hence mechanically producing the failure-free
coordinator AC-Graph. By exploiting it, the components given as input to our method can be composed, to make a system,
in a way that it is deadlock-free and guarantees the specified composed system purposes.
Note that, guaranteeing a coordination policy is done analogously to guaranteeing deadlock freedom except for the
fact that we do not require a specification for deadlock freedom. Actually, in order to prevent deadlocks, it is required
that the components’ interaction (embedded in the no-op coordinator) exhibits at least one deadlock-free behaviour.
Then, through the deadlock-free coordinator, the non-deadlock-free behaviours are disabled and only the deadlock-free
ones are exhibited. Analogously, for guaranteeing a coordination policy, it is required (after deadlock prevention) that the
components’ interaction (embedded in the deadlock-free coordinator) exhibits at least all the behaviours modelled by the
specified policy. Then, through the failure-free coordinator, the behaviours that do not guarantee the policy are disabled and
only the ones that guarantee the policy are exhibited.
A coordination policy AC-Graph is defined over a specific alphabet of actions that are semantically equivalent
to component actions. Let C1, . . . , Cn be the components given as input to our method, and let AC1[f1] =
(S1, T1,D1, s
1
0), . . . , ACn[fn] = (Sn, Tn,Dn, sn0) be the corresponding relabelled AC-Graphs. Let U = (
⋃n
i=1 Ti) \ {τ} be the
universal set of observable component actions. U is ranged over by α,α1,α2, . . . . Unlike actions in a component AC-Graph,
each action in U has associated an identifier specifying which component (in the CFA-system) performs that action. For
instance, for our explanatory example, !C3.method1_1models the action !C3.method1 performed by the component
C1. In the following we formally define the syntax of coordination policy actions. As it is usually done, the syntax is
formalized by means of a grammar that is used to build action labels for a coordination policy.
Definition 14 (Coordination Policy Actions Syntax). The universal set CPActU , of coordination policy actions (ranged over by
l, l1, l2, . . .) over U, is the set of action labels generated by the following grammar:
l ::= α | Neg(α) | ?true_# | {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} | [α1, . . . ,αk],
where Neg is a relabelling function over U such that, let α1 =?a1,α2 =!a2 ∈ U, Neg(α1) =?-a1 and Neg(α2) =!-a2.
The syntax of the action labels in CPActU is similar to the syntax of the action labels in a relabelled component AC-Graph
except for two kinds of action: (i) a universal action (i.e., ?true_#) which models any possible observable component action
(i.e., any action in U), and (ii) a negative action which models any possible observable component action different from
the same negative action; for instance, for our explanatory example, the negative action !-C3.method1_1models all the
actions inU different from!C3.method1_1.Moreover, action labels in CPActU can be also simple formula obtained as logical
“AND” or “OR” composition of action labels. The “AND” composition is restricted to only negative actions and it is denoted
bymeans of the notation {. . .}. The “OR” composition is restricted to only regular actions and, for it, the notation [. . .] is used.
The semantics of action labels in CPActU is defined as follows, bymeans of a specific notion of semantic equivalence between
coordination policy actions. Note that, since observable component actions in a relabelled AC-Graph are a particular case
of coordination policy actions (i.e., they are regular actions α), our notion of semantic equivalence defines also a semantic
correspondence between component AC-Graph observable actions and coordination policy actions.
Informally, our notion of semantic equivalence between two coordination policy actions l1 and l2 is defined with respect
to the set of regular actions that can correspond to l1 and l2. If l1 and l2 are such that the interception of their sets of
corresponding regular actions is not empty, then we say that l1 shares the meaning of (or, simply,matches) l2.
Definition 15 (Coordination Policy Actions Semantics). Let l1, l2 ∈ CPActU , we say that l1 shares the meaning of l2 or, simply, l1
matches l2 (denoted by l1 ∼=U l2) if there exists a binary relation∼=U relating l1 and l2 (i.e., (l1, l2) ∈∼=U with∼=U⊆ CPActU×CPActU)
such that:
Regular action:
• α1 ∼=U α2 ⇐⇒ α1 = α2
• α1 ∼=U Neg(α2) ⇐⇒ α1 6= α2
• α∼=U ?true_#
• α∼=U {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} ⇐⇒ ∧mi=1 (α 6= αi)• α∼=U [α1, . . . ,αk] ⇐⇒ ∨kj=1 (α = αj).
Negative action:
• Neg(α1)∼=U α2 ⇐⇒ α1 6= α2
• Neg(α1)∼=U Neg(α2)
• Neg(α)∼=U ?true_#
• Neg(α)∼=U {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} ⇐⇒ {α1, . . . ,αm} 6= U
• Neg(α)∼=U [α1, . . . ,αk] ⇐⇒ ∨kj=1 (α 6= αj).
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• ?true_#∼=U {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} ⇐⇒ {α1, . . . ,αm} 6= U
• ?true_#∼=U [α1, . . . ,αk].
AND-composition of negative actions:
• {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} ∼=U α ⇐⇒ ∧mi=1 (αi 6= α)• {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} ∼=U Neg(α) ⇐⇒ {α1, . . . ,αm} 6= U
• {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} ∼=U ?true_# ⇐⇒ {α1, . . . ,αm} 6= U
• {Neg(α11), . . . ,Neg(α1m)} ∼=U {Neg(α21), . . . ,Neg(α2n)} ⇐⇒ ({α11, . . . ,α1m} 6= U)
∨
({α21, . . . ,α2n} 6= U)
• {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} ∼=U [α1, . . . ,αk] ⇐⇒ ∨ki=1(∧mj=1(αj 6= αi)).
OR-composition of regular actions:
• [α1, . . . ,αk] ∼=U α ⇐⇒ ∨kj=1 (αj = α)
• [α1, . . . ,αk] ∼=U Neg(α) ⇐⇒ ∨kj=1 (αj 6= α)• [α1, . . . ,αk] ∼=U ?true_#
• [α1, . . . ,αk] ∼=U {Neg(α1), . . . ,Neg(αm)} ⇐⇒ ∨ki=1(∧mj=1(αi 6= αj))





A coordination policy AC-Graph (with respect to a universal set U of relabelled component AC-Graph observable actions) is
defined over a set of transition labels that is a sub-set of CPActU .
Definition 16 (Coordination Policy AC-Graph). Let C1, . . . , Cn be n components, let AC1[f1] = (S1, T1,D1, s10), . . . , ACn[fn] =
(Sn, Tn,Dn, s
n
0) be their corresponding relabelled AC-Graphs, and let U = (
⋃n
i=1 Ti) \ {τ}; a coordination policy AC-Graph over
CPActU for C1, . . . , Cn is a deadlock-free and, possibly, non-deterministic AC-Graph P = (SP, TP,DP, sP0) where SP is the set of
states, TP is the set of transitions labels such that TP ⊆ CPActU , DP is the set of transitions, and sp0 is the initial state.
Abusing terminology, for a coordination policy AC-Graph P we say that P is non-deterministic if ∃(s, l1, s′), (s, l2, s′′) ∈ DP :
s′ 6= s′′ ∧ l1 ∼=U l2, otherwise P is deterministic. To increase the expressiveness of our LTS-based notation for the specification
of coordination policies, SYNTHESIS can deal with both deterministic and non-deterministic coordination policy AC-Graphs.
For our purposes, we extend thematching operator “∼=U” to traces of actions in CPActU: let t1 = l11 . . . l1m, t2 = l21 . . . l2m ∈ CPAct∗U ,
then t1 ∼=U t2 ⇐⇒ ∧mi=1(l1i ∼=U l2i ).
In Fig. 6, we report a SYNTHESIS screen-shot that shows a possible coordination policy AC-Graph for our explanatory
example (it is a deterministic policy AC-Graph).
Each state represents states of the system to be built (through the insertion of a failure-free coordinator, if possible). The
state S0 is the initial state of the coordination policy AC-Graph.
“AlternatingProtocol” (shown in Fig. 6) specifies behaviours of the system to be built guaranteeing that method1 of C3
will be invoked by C1 and C2 using an alternating invocation protocol, i.e., it will be invoked first by C1, then by C2, and so
on. By continuing our explanatory example and by considering AlternatingProtocol as the coordination policy that must be
guaranteed, we show (in the following section) the application of the coordination policy guarantee step to the coordinator
shown in Fig. 5.
5.4.2. Generic coordination failures prevention
As informally introduced in Section 5.4.1, our algorithm for guaranteeing coordination policies can be organized in two
phases.
The first phase concerns a variant of the algorithm used to perform a trace containment check [23] between two LTSs. The
second phase concerns a variant of the algorithm used to perform the synchronous product [36,38] between LTSs.
M. Tivoli, P. Inverardi / Science of Computer Programming 71 (2008) 181–212 195
In other words, to derive the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph, our method firstly check whether guaranteeing a
coordination policy is possible or not through a trace containment check between a coordination policy AC-Graph and the
deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph.
Definition 17 (Trace Containment Under∼=U). Let L1 = (S1, T1,D1, s10) and L2 = (S2, T2,D2, s20) be two LTSs, and let T1, T2⊆ CPActU for some universal set of observable actions U; we say that Tr(L1) is contained under ∼=U in Tr(L2) (written
Tr(L1) ⊆∼=U Tr(L2)) if and only if ∀t ∈ Tr(L1) : ∃t′ ∈ Tr(L2) : t ∼=U t′.
Given a coordination policy AC-Graph P and the deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph Kdf , this check is used to verify
whether Tr(P)⊆∼=U Tr(Kdf ) or not. This check is implemented by a suitable notion of refinement [23]. Refinement, in general,
formalizes the relation between two LTSs at different level of abstractions. Refinement is usually defined as a variant of
simulation. In this paper, we use a suitable notion of strong simulation [23] to check a refinement relation between two LTSs
with observable actions over CPActU (i.e., P and Kdf ). To do this, we use the matching operator “∼=U” as action comparison
operator of the simulation.
Definition 18 (Simulation Under∼=U). Let L1 = (S1, T1,D1, s10) and L2 = (S2, T2,D2, s20) be two LTSs, and let T1, T2 ⊆ CPActU for
some universal set of observable actions U; a relation ≤∼=U⊆ S1 × S2 is a strong simulation under ∼=U , or simulation under ∼=U
for short, where s ≤∼=U v if and only if ∀s′ ∈ S1 : ∀l ∈ T1 : s l−→ s′ H⇒∃v ∈ S2 : v l
′−→ v′ ∧ l ∼=U l′ ∧ s′ ≤∼=U v′. We say L2 simulates
under∼=U L1, written L1 ≤∼=U L2, if and only if s10 ≤∼=U s20.
Theorem 1 (A Trivial Variant of the Analogous Theorem Described in [23]). Let L1 and L2 be LTSs where L1 ≤∼=U L2, then
Tr(L1) ⊆∼=U Tr(L2).
If Tr(P) ⊆∼=U Tr(Kdf ) (otherwise it is not possible to guarantee P), the second phase of our algorithm for guaranteeing
coordination policies takes into account Kdf and P to perform a kind of synchronous product between Kdf and P. We denote
with Kf the obtained failure-free coordinator AC-Graph.
Definition 19 (Failure-Free Coordinator AC-Graph). Let Kdf = (S, T,D, s0) be the maximal deadlock-free coordinator AC-
Graph for the relabelled component AC-Graphs AC1[f1] = (S1, T1,D1, s10), . . . , ACn[fn] = (Sn, Tn,Dn, sn0), let U = (
⋃n
i=1 Ti) \ {τ},
let P = (SP, TP,DP, p0) be a coordination policy AC-Graph over CPActU such that Tr(P) ⊆∼=U Tr(Kdf ); Kf = (S′, T ′,D′, s′0) is the
corresponding failure-free coordinator AC-Graph if the following properties hold:
• States: S′ ⊆ S× SP
• Root: s′0 = (s0, p0)
• Transition labels: T ′ ⊆ T
• Policy-Guarantee: ((s1, p1),α, (s2, p2)) ∈ D′ ⇐⇒ ∃(s1,α, s2) ∈ D : ∃(p1, l, p2) ∈ DP : α ∼=U l
• Reachability: ∀s ∈ S′ : ∃µ ∈ T ′∗ : µ is a trace leading to s.
In order to correctly guarantee a coordination policy, we should guarantee that the synthesized failure-free coordinator
exhibits all the interactions specified through the coordination policy AC-Graph. This is ensured by Tr(P)⊆∼=U Tr(Kdf ) and by
Property “Policy-Guarantee” that guarantees that the set of traces of the deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph is restricted
to those traces that “match” all the policy AC-Graph traces.
We have givenDefinitions 17–19 by having inmind the case of only one coordination policy. Indeed, ourmethods iterates
the policy guarantee step formalized by means of Definitions 17–19 for all the specified coordination policies. That is, after
our method has built Kf for the kth policy, it passes to build a K′f from Kf and the (k + 1)th policy. This method iterates (to
the next policy guarantee step) only if the set of traces of the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph derived at the last iteration
contains the set of traces of the next policy AC-Graph, otherwise it stops unsuccessfully.
In Fig. 7, we show the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph for our explanatory example (the trace containment check
between the AC-Graph of “AlternatingProtocol” and the deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph of our example is valid).
By referring to Fig. 7, we can see that the failure-free coordinator, from its initial state S0, prevents the component C2
from performing a request of C3.method1 before that component C1 has performed that request. Moreover C1 and C2
perform the request of C3.method1 by following a strictly alternating protocol, i.e., C1 first, then C2, and so on.
From the failure-free coordinator’s AC-Graph, by exploiting the information stored in each state and arc, we can
automatically derive the code that implements the deadlock-free coordinator component that performs the specified
coordination policies (i.e., the correct composition code). The technique used to automatically derive the actual code
that implements the failure-free coordinator component is presented in [30,39] in the context of COM/DCOM and EJB
components, respectively.
5.4.3. Evaluation
In this section, by exploiting the analysis, made in [55], of some concurrent system specification notations existing in the
literature, we evaluate our notation with respect to the existing ones and motivate its use within our application context.
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Fig. 7. Failure-free coordinator AC-Graph.
In the literature there are many languages for reasoning about concurrent systems in order to support their functional
property analysis. For example, in the context of software verification via model-checking techniques, these languages
belongs all to the formalism of temporal logics, e.g., Linear-Time Temporal Logic (LTL) [44,45] and other similar formalisms
(such as CTL, ACTL). These formalisms make use of temporal operators (e.g., globally, eventually, next, until operators of LTL)
that allow one to express a variety of functional system requirements that range from safety to liveness properties.
In this paper, for the coordination policy specification task, we focused on a more simple LTS-based formalism although
less expressive. In particular, our LTS-based formalism belongs to regular expressions and, hence, it supports the process of
guaranteeing only safety properties.
The main motivation behind our choice has been to find, within the application domain of the SYNTHESIS tool (i.e.,
automatic component composition and coordination), an acceptable compromise between expressive power and simplicity
of use. Actually, the simplicity of our LTS-based notation (used to specify coordination policies) increases not much the
practicality of the automatic coordinator synthesis that might be carried on (by implementing the needed technical
modifications) also taking into account, e.g., LTL, but it increasesmore the usability of the SYNTHESIS tool. As deeply discussed
in [55], it is well-known that expressing properties in LTL and other related logics is a difficult task. For example, Holzmann
in [46] shows that writing LTL formulae is an error prone task and, hence, the inherent complexity of LTL may cause users to
specify properties incorrectly. For this reason, the introduction of temporal logic-based techniques in an industrial software
life-cycle requires specific skills and good tool support. As a matter of fact, industries are not willing to use the above
mentioned techniques [47].
Many works in the last years propose solutions to overcome this problem. While one proposal is to construct a library of
predefined LTL formulae from which a user can choose [48], other works propose the specification of temporal properties
through graphical formalisms [49–54]. Any of these solutions have advantages and disadvantages. For example, as reported
in [55], “... Graphical Interval Logic (GIL) [49] is sufficiently expressive but its formulae become potentially difficult to understand.
This difficulty comes from the fact that its graphical notation is very close to temporal logic syntax. Visual Timed event Scenarios
(VTS) [52,53] is a visual language for expressing event-based requirements. In this language system events are considered
any observable and interesting changes (from the point of view of the verification) during the system execution. Thus events
are considered to be more abstract and general than message exchanging (e.g., an event can be a key press or an internal
state change) ....” Consequently, differently from us, they do not explicitly consider component-based systems (where
interaction is modelled by message passing). “... Other approaches [58,61] define graphical languages that appear to be not
easily comprehensible and not easily integrable into industrial software development processes ....”
It iswell-known [57,59] that all LTL formulae can be translated into a Büchi automaton [60]. Although this representation,
as it is usual for graphical representations, looksmore intuitive than the corresponding LTL formula, it can be still difficult to
directly represent a property as a Büchi automaton. To overcome this problem, in the literature, extendedMessage Sequence
Chart (MSC) notations have been proposed (see [51,55,56] and reference therein). Being based on MSCs, these notations are
more intuitive andmore commonly used in software development practice, although they still require for the users specific
skills.
We are aware of the limited expressiveness of our LTS-based notation with respect to the above discussed temporal
logic notations (e.g., LTS), but as already said this has been voluntarily done in order to increase the usability of SYNTHESIS
in specifying coordination policies. Furthermore, we are also aware of the fact that our LTS-based notation, for complex
coordination policies, can be less intuitive than a MSC-based notation such as the one described in [55,56]. However, we
have chosen a LTS-based notation in order not to force the synthesis user to learn new notations beyond LTSs, that is in
order to reduce the formal knowledge, needed to use SYNTHESIS, to a single formalism, i.e., LTSs.
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Moreover note that, by continuing to use LTSs as internal coordination policy specification language, we could
easily simplify the task of specifying coordination policies within SYNTHESIS by implementing a library of predefined
coordination policies. Each policy would be denoted by a human understandable language and automatically translated
in the corresponding coordination policy AC-Graph, analogously to what has been done in [48] for properties internally
expressed in LTL. However, note that the main topic of this paper is on automatic component composition and coordination
and not on behavioural property or coordination policy specification. Thus, the complete treatment of property specification
patterns and their mapping into our notation is out of the scope of this paper and left to possible future work.
5.5. Failure-free coordinator synthesis algorithm
In this section, we summarize the steps of the entire algorithm used to automatically build the failure-free coordinator’s
AC-Graph and to automatically derive from it the correct (with respect to failure freedom) assembly code for the components
forming the specified CFA-system:
• let C1, . . . , Cn be n components whose behavioural interfaces encode the LTSs AC1, . . . , ACn, respectively;
• let P1, . . . , Pm be coordination policies AC-Graphs that model the intended behaviour for the system to be built and formed by
C1, . . . , Cn;
the failure-free coordinator Kf that we want to build and the assembly code A that we want to derive are built by performing the
following algorithm:
(1) from AC1, . . . , ACn build the no-op coordinator AC-Graph Kno-op;
(2) IF Kno-op contains deadlock states THEN, from it, build the maximal deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph Kdf ;
(3) if Kdf is empty THEN exit(FAILURE);
(4) FOR EACH k = 1, . . . ,m DO:
(a) if Tr(P) *∼=U Tr(Kdf ) THEN exit(FAILURE);
(b) build, from Kdf and Pk, the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph Kf (see Definition 19);
(c) replace Kdf with Kf ;
(5) derive from Kf the assembly code A;
(6) exit(SUCCESS).
Note that steps 1 and 2 are realized by implementing, within SYNTHESIS, the algorithms reported in Appendix and
described in [17,18]. Step 3 is trivial and consists in checking whether Kdf has no transitions or not.
Step 4(a) is realized by applying Theorem 1 that, in turn, is realized by implementing the algorithm formalized by
Definitions 17 and 18.
Step 4(b) is realized by implementing, within SYNTHESIS, the algorithm that is formalized through Definition 19 (a
preliminary version of this algorithm is also described in [17,18]). By referring to Definition 19, and as already said in
Section 5.4.1, in order to build the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph from the maximal deadlock-free coordinator AC-
Graph Kdf and the AC-Graph of a coordination policy Pk, SYNTHESIS performs a suitable version of the classical synchronous
product [36,38] between LTSs. Differently from the classical version, this new version does not simply match the transition
labels by performing a syntactical match (i.e., checking for the equality of two strings) but, in order to perform the match,
it uses the operator∼=U that is rigorously formalized by Definition 15. Thus, the used algorithm first performs the Cartesian
product of the set of states of Kdf and Pk hence building the set of states of Kf (see property “States” of Definition 19). Then, the
set of transitions of Kf is generated by performing the step formalized by property “Policy-Guarantee” of Definition 19. Note
that, in general, at this point, Kf can be a disconnected graph made of either strongly or weakly disconnected components.
Finally, the algorithmdiscards all the disconnected components that do not contain the initial state hence satisfying property
“Reachability” of Definition 19. Since this algorithm comes directly from the formalization of Definition 19, we do not add
a its description in Appendix and consider for it the previous informal explanation coupled with Definition 19.
Step 4(c) is trivial. Step 5 is out of the scope of this paper and it is described in detail in [30]. Step 6 terminates.
6. Case study
In this section, we validate our approach at work by means of an industrial case study. The case study concerns the
semi-automatic assembly of part of a large distributed system built in the context of the CUSPIS project [41].
6.1. The CUSPIS project
In the European project society [41], increasing importance is given to the issue of safeguarding, fruiting and supporting
the Cultural Heritage. The European commission [41] gives highly importance to that issue, promoting actions for protection
and safeguarding, improving understanding and dissemination of culture and history of the European citizen, making
Cultural Heritage increasingly available and accessible.
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Fig. 8. The certificate process.
The CUSPIS project combines the Cultural Assets (CAs)7 infrastructure with the GALILEO and EGNOS ones in order to
support the Cultural Heritage safeguarding and protection. To this extent the CUSPIS project focuses on the specification,
implementation and deployment of secure information mobility platforms that offer two basic services: Cultural Assets
Management (CAM) and Cultural Assets Fruition (CAF).
CAF concerns the dissemination of CAs information everywhere, e.g., people can go around in a museum and receive CAs
information on their mobile devices. CAM concerns the secure transport of CAs from a renter (the organization requiring
the CAs) to the owner (the organization that holds the CAs).
The CAM process requires three sub-processes: (i) the certificate request, (ii) the certificate generation, and (iii) the
monitoring of the CA transport.
In this work we focus on the CAM service and we show how our approach has been used to automatically implement the
certificate generation service out of a set of already implemented black-box components. In Fig. 8 we show the two basic
activities that the certificate generation service has to support.
In the first activity (see Fig. 8(A)) the renter and the owner produce a request certificate that expresses their approval
to move a CA from the owner location to the renter one (i.e., the CA journey). In the following we describe in details all
the request certificate fields. The CA_ID field is a signed string that contains the unique identifier of the CA to be moved.
Motivation is a string that describes themotivation leading to the Cultural Asset journey. The fieldrenter (resp.,owner)
contains the X500 name [42] of the renter (resp., owner) entity. The field RenterSignature (resp., OwnerSignature)
contains the signature of the fields (owner,Motivation,owner,Renter) that is generatedwith the renter (resp., owner)
private key.8
In the second phase (see Fig. 8(B)) the CA owner and a ministry authorized person produce a validation certificate that
is used to certify the ministry consensus to the CA journey. The request certificate field contains the request certificate
produced during the first activity. The owner and ministry fields contain the X500 name of the owner and ministry
authorized person, respectively. The Ministry Signature (resp., Owner Signature) contains the signature of the
fields (request certificate, Owner, Ministry) that is generated with the owner (resp., Ministry) private key. In
the following section we describe the set of existing components that we have taken into account to automatically and
correctly assemble the part of the CUSPIS project that realizes the certificate generation service.
6.2. The existing components and SYNTHESIS at work
In Fig. 9 we show the CUSPIS sub-system that actualizes the certification service.
The component adaptor Ao, the X500 name server So, and the security component To reside on the owner host. The
component adaptor Am, the X500 name server Sm, and the security component Tm reside on the ministry host. The renter
certificate client Cr, the owner certificate client Co, and the ministry certificate client Cm can access to the owner and
ministry hosts through the public network. The clients Cr and Co interact in order to produce the request certificate. The
clients Cr and Cm interact in order to produce the validation certificate.
We remark that the request certificate must be always produced before the validation one. This is the overall purpose of
the (sub-)system to be assembled.
In our case study we have to face two main problems of adaptation. The first problem is consequence of the use of
existing components in a different context from the one they have been originally thought. In particular these components
were developed in a previous project and we want to reuse them in the context of the CUSPIS project because they already
realize the required functionalities. The second problem is due to the use of the adaptor and of the X500 server in different
hosts, i.e., the ministry and the owner host. These different uses require different adaptations of the same components.
7 In the context of the CUSPIS project, examples of cultural assets are sculpture, pictures and so on.
8 SHA with RSA algorithm is used to produce the signature.
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Fig. 9. The CUSPIS system: the certification sub-system.
Fig. 10. AC-Graphs of the adaptor components.
Fig. 11. AC-Graphs of the server components.
In Figs. 10–13 we show the AC-Graphs of our existing components as they are displayed by the SYNTHESIS tool. The
AC-Graphs of the two adaptor components Ao, and Am are shown in Fig. 10; Fig. 11 shows the AC-Graphs of the server
components So, Sm, To, and Tm; finally the AC-Graphs of the two client components Cr, and Cm, and the AC-Graphs of the
client component Co are shown in Figs. 12 and 13, respectively.
The AC-Graphs of the adaptor and server components can be easily understood by looking at the Figs. 10 and 11,
respectively. The AC-Graphs of the adaptors and servers do not need further explanation because the semantics of their
transitions is explained, in the following, while discussing the LTSs of the clients.
In the initial state the renter (resp., ministry) client Cr (resp., Cm) can send the connection request to the server So (resp.,
Sm) and, from the state S1, it can receive the successful connection notification. After a correct connection, the client (either
the renter or the ministry) can send the request setAdaptor (to either Ao or Am), followed by the request setX500name
(to either So or Sm according to the previous call of setAdaptor). The setAdaptor request is used to set the motivation
and the CA_ID of the request certificate. The setX500name request is used to set the X500 renter (or ministry) name
in the validation certificate. The request releaseX500 is sent from Cr (resp., Cm) to So (resp., Sm) in order to release
the resource it has acquired. The request releaseAdaptor is used to release the Ao (resp., Am) resource. Note that the
releaseAdaptor request involves the process of sending the renter (resp., the ministry) signature in order to sign the
request certificate.
The owner client Co (see Fig. 13) performs almost the same behaviour as the one of either Cr or Cm. The only difference
is that Co calls a setX500name followed by a setAdaptor, whereas Cr and Cm call a setAdaptor followed by a
setX500Name.
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Fig. 12. AC-Graphs of the client components Cr, and Cm.
Fig. 13. AC-Graph of the client component Co.
In Fig. 14 we show the coordination policy AC-Graph specified, by using SYNTHESIS, to model the system desired
behaviour that we wish to guarantee in order to correctly assemble the previously specified components. We denote it
as P1. It is an high-level description of a desired behaviour that we want to guarantee on the interaction of the components
to be assembled in order to form the desired composed system.
P1 specifies that the ministry client Cm (i.e., C5 within SYNTHESIS) and the owner client Co have to interact with the
ministry server (i.e., C4) only after both the renter client Cr (i.e., C6) and the owner client Co (i.e., C7) have released the
adaptor resource (state S3 shown in Fig. 14). In other words, it models the fact that the request certificate must be always
written before the validation certificate, that is the overall purpose of the system to be assembled.
By referring to themethod described in Section 5, by taking into account the AC-Graphs shown in Figs. 10–13, SYNTHESIS
automatically derives the no-op coordinator AC-Graph Kno-op and, from it, the corresponding deadlock-free version Kdf .
Finally, by taking into account P1 (see Fig. 14), SYNTHESIS automatically derives, after that the trace containment check
between P1 and Kdf has been successfully performed, the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph Kf that models the correct
assembly code for the system to be build.
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Fig. 14. P1: the coordination policy AC-Graph of the system desired behaviour that must be guaranteed.
Fig. 15. Deadlock traces in the AC-Graph of Kno-op: a fragment.
The generation of Kno-op took 11.5min, by running SYNTHESIS on aMacBook Pro, 1.83GHz Intel Core Duo, 1GBDDR2 SDRAM.
This AC-Graph has 8031 states and 15332 transitions. Due to its size, the graphical representation within the SYNTHESIS tool
of Kno-op is obviously unreadable, hence we do not show it. Despite this, SYNTHESIS returns useful information about the
possible deadlocks.
For instance, Kno-op has two deadlock states, i.e., S4842 and S5204. Beyond these two states, it has also eight states
always leading to deadlock states. Their IDs are S4881, S4994, S5215, S5240, S4841, S4891, S5203, and S5220. From
the states S4881, S4994, S4841, and S4891 only the deadlock state S4842 can be reached. From the states S5215, S524,
S5203, and S5220 only the deadlock state S5204 can be reached. By referring to the deadlocking states mentioned above,
in Fig. 15 we show a fragment of the Kno-op that concerns the final portion of each deadlock trace. In the figure the deadlock
states are drawn light-gray and the ones always leading to them are drawn dark-gray.
For instance, one deadlock (among all the detected ones) occurs whenever the components Ao, So, Am,Sm, Cm, Cr, Co,
To, and Tm reach, respectively, the state S1, S2, S0, S2, S3, S3, S5, S0, S0 (i.e., the tuple of component states corresponding
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to the global state S3553 of Kno-op), and the ministry certificate client Cm performs a request of setAdaptor towards the
adaptor Am. At this point, SYNTHESIS automatically proceeds by performing a deadlock prevention procedure on Kno-op hence
producing the deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph Kdf . It has been generated by taking 2.5 seconds, it has 8021 states and
15316 transitions. The memory usage has been 10 MB.
Now, the coordination policy guarantee step must be performed by taking into account the synthesized Kdf and the
specified P1. It produces the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph Kf , after that Tr(P1) ⊆∼=U Tr(Kdf ) has been checked.
The generation of Kf took 5.7 min. This failure-free coordinator AC-Graph has 17825 states and 33867 transitions. The
memory usage has been 27 megabytes. Due to its size, the graphical representation within the SYNTHESIS tool of Kf is
obviously unreadable as it has been for Kno-op, hence we do not show it. However, SYNTHESIS outputs also a textual format of
the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph and by looking at its content (partially shown below) we can see that P1 has been
guaranteed. For instance, note that from the initial state the actions ?C4.connect_7 and ?C4.connect_5 are not
performed (in contrast to what can be performed, from the initial state, by the deadlock-free coordinator). Furthermore,
the above mentioned actions can be performed only after C6 and C7 have released the adaptor resource by performing
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From Kf , by exploiting the information stored in each state and arc, SYNTHESIS automatically derives the code that
implements the failure-free coordinator component. That is the deadlock-free coordinator componentwhich guarantees the
specified coordination policy on the interaction of the other components in the system (i.e., the correct assembly code). The
technique used to automatically derive the actual code, and the same code, that implements the failure-free coordinator, for
our case study, is presented in [43]. It is discussed in the context of EJBs applications. In that paper the failure-free coordinator
has been implemented in a distributed way. That is as a set of component wrappers each of them local to each component.
Each component wrapper is an AspectJ aspect instrumenting the code of the wrapped component and cooperating with the
otherwrappers in order to realize the specified coordination policy and avoid possible deadlocks.We refer to [43] for further
details on the distributed implementation of the synthesized failure-free coordinator.
7. Dealing with normalization
In this section we show that, under suitable assumptions, within our reference architectural style it is possible to reduce
an n-layer system to a set of n single layered (sub-)systems. By means of this decomposition, the automatic coordinator
synthesis approach above presented can be applied to single layered systems as well as to multi-layered ones.
In Section 4 we said that a component in our architectural style has a notion of both top and bottom interface. A
component can request a service provided by another component and can receive a response (i.e., component client side).
On the other hand a component can receive a request for a service it provides and can return a response (i.e., component
server side). In a single layered system (e.g., a client–server application in COM/DCOM) a component that declares only its
top interface is seen as a client component. Analogously, a component that declares only its bottom interface is seen as a
server component. In the case of a multi-layered system, it is possible to have a component that is both server and client.
This component declares both a top and a bottom interface.9
In Section 4, we specified the behaviour of a component in terms of the LTS representing the sequences of messages
exchanged with the environment. Referring to the notions of top interface and bottom interface, we can separate the
behaviour of a component within the hierarchy of a multi-layered system into two behaviours: (i) top component behaviour,
which is the behaviour representing only the sequences of top interface messages exchanged with the environment, and
(ii) bottom component behaviour, which is the behaviour representing only the sequences of bottom interface messages
exchanged with the environment. In Fig. 16 we show how to decompose a n-layer system into n single layered systems in
the case of n = 2.
9 This is the case of a composite server which encapsulates other servers and requires services to them in order to implement its own services.
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We are able to perform the normalization shown in Fig. 16 because, under the constraints of our architectural style and
by assuming that we deal with multi-layered systems that are built by imposing non-cyclic architectural configurations,10
we are able to decompose the component behaviour in order to make the layers of a multi-layered system completely
independent to each other. In this way, we first reduce amulti-layered system to a set of single layered subsystems and then
we build a coordinator for each of them. In fact by exploiting our architectural style and the above mentioned assumptions,
let Ci be a component in a intermediate layer of a multi-layered system, we can always derive a partition of the actions
performed by Ci in two disjoint sets of actions that are related to the actions of the top interface and of the bottom interface
of Ci, respectively. Otherwise, referring to howwemodel a system (see Definitions 9 and 10), Ci might not be an intermediate
component for all components above and below it. That is the two sets {Cj} and {Ck} of components above and below Ci
(respectively) might have components that directly synchronize with components of the other set. This, in turn, implies that
the system formed by Ci the components in {Cj} and in {Ck} would not be a multi-layered system (i.e., for instance a three
layered system with Ci in the intermediate layer) but it would be a single layered system where Ci and the components in
{Cj} and in {Ck}might be directly connected (through connectors) to each other.
Although it is common to see cyclic component dependencies in many real-scale component-based systems, the
restriction required to perform the multi-layered system decomposition above mentioned can be often bypassed. In fact,
in many cases, such cyclic dependencies can be avoided by changing the system design, e.g., by aggregating in a single
component all components in the component cyclic chain or by duplicating component instances that share the same internal
state in order to sequentialize the cyclic chain of components. Moreover, in a black-box or COTS component setting such as
legacy systems, this kind of configurations is not common (refer to Chapter 4, Page 36 of [28]) and, hence, our context is not
always completely cyclic.
Informally let ACi be the AC-Graph of a component Ci, by considering the set TopInterface(Ci) as the set of all actions in LAACi
that are also actions of the top interface of Ci, we derive the BAC-Graph (Bottom interface ACtual behaviour Graph) of Ci from ACi
by collapsing, in a unique state, the “from” and the “to” states of all transitions labelledwith actions in TopInterface(Ci). Finally
we eliminate these transitions. In this way the BAC-Graph of Ci identifies the bottom component behaviour of Ci. Analogously
we derive the TAC-Graph (Top interface ACtual behaviour Graph) of a component Ci from its AC-Graph ACi by collapsing, in a
unique state, the “from” and the “to” states of all transitions labelled with actions of the bottom interface of Ci (i.e., all actions
in BottomInterface(Ci)) and by eliminating these transitions. In this way the TAC-Graph of Ci identifies the top component
behaviour of Ci. It is worthwhile noticing that BAC-Graph and TAC-Graph are always AC-Graphs. In the rest of this section,
we give the formal definition of the algorithm used for automatically constructing a TAC-Graph. To do this, we first present
the following:
Definition 20 (BottomInterface(Ci)). Let (NACi , AACi , LAACi , S0) be the AC-Graph ACi of a component Ci and for all k 6= i let
(NACk , AACk , LAACk , S0) be the AC-Graph ACk of a component Ck below Ci, then the bottom interface of Ci (BottomInterface(Ci))
is the set of actions {α ∈ LAACi such that α ∈ LAACk for some k}.
Informally, the algorithm of Definition 21 “collapses” (steps 1, 2 and 3) linear and/or cyclic paths made only of actions of
the component’s bottom interface, respectively. Moreover, they also avoid (step 4) possible “redundant” non-deterministic
behaviours.11
Definition 21 (TAC-Graph Construction Algorithm). Let (NACi , AACi , LAACi , S0) be the AC-Graph ACi of a component Ci, then we
derive the corresponding Top interface ACtual behaviour (TAC) Graph TACi as follows:
(1) at the beginning TACi is equal to (NTACi , ATACi , LATACi , S0) where NTACi = NACi , ATACi = AACi and LATACi = LAACi ;
(2) for each loop (ν,α, ν) ∈ ATACi where α ∈ BottomInterface(Ci) do:• remove (ν,α, ν) from ATACi ;
(3) for each arc (ν,β,µ) ∈ ATACi , where β ∈ BottomInterface(Ci) do:• remove (ν,β,µ) from ATACi ;• if µ is equal to S0 then: set ν as the starting state S0 and the label of ν as the label S0;
• for each other arc (ν, γ,µ) ∈ ATACi do: replace (ν, γ,µ) with (ν, γ, ν);• for each arc (µ, δ, ν) ∈ ATACi do: replace (µ, δ, ν) with (ν, δ, ν);• for each arc (µ,ψ,ρ) ∈ ATACi with ρ 6= µ, ν do: replace (µ,ψ,ρ) with (ν,ψ,ρ);• for each arc (ρ, ζ,µ) ∈ ATACi with ρ 6= µ, ν do: replace (ρ, ζ,µ) with (ρ, ζ, ν);• for each loop (µ,η,µ) ∈ ATACi do: replace (µ,η,µ) with (ν,η, ν);• remove µ from NTACi ;
(4) until TACi does not contain arcs labelled with the same action and outgoing the same state do:
• for each pair of loops (ν, ι, ν) and (ν, ι, ν) ∈ ATACi do:
. remove (ν, ι, ν) from ATACi ;• for each pair of arcs (ν, κ,µ) and (ν, κ,µ) ∈ ATACi do:
. remove (ν, κ,µ) from the ATACi ;
10 This avoids, e.g., the case of a component C1 that requires a service s to a component C2 that, in order to implement s, requires a service s′ to a component
C3 that, in turn to implement s′ , requires a service to C1 .
11 These behaviours might be a side effect due to the collapsing.
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• for each pair of arcs ((ν,λ,µ) and (ν,λ,υ)) or ((ν,λ, ν) and (ν,λ,υ)) ∈ ATACi do:
. remove (ν,λ,υ) from ATACi ;
. if υ is equal to S0 then: set ν as the starting state S0 and the label of ν as the label S0;
. for each ingoing arc tin in υ, outgoing arc tout from υ and loop tloop on υ do: move the extremity on υ of tin, tout and
tloop on ν;
. remove υ from NTACi .
The formal definition of the BAC-Graph construction algorithm is very similar to Definition 21 given by considering a set
of Ci actions called “TopInterface(Ci)”, which is defined analogously to “BottomInterface(Ci)” (see Definition 20). Thus, for
the sake of brevity, we omit the formal definition of the BAC-Graph construction algorithm.
8. Correctness and completeness
In this sectionwe prove correctness and completeness properties of our approach. Broadly speaking, to do this, we prove:
• Failure-freedom: the CBA-system is failure-free or, in other words, it is deadlock-free and guarantees the specified
coordination policies; that is,
(i) Deadlock-freedom: the CBA-system is deadlock-free; and
(ii) Coordination-policy-preservation: all the traces of Kf , “match” with traces of the coordination policy AC-Graph;
• Component-protocol-preservation: all the traces of Kf , “projected” on the alphabet of a component AC-Graph ACi, are
included in the set of traces of ACi (for all i and by ignoring possible τ-transitions in a projected trace of Kf );
• Completeness: all the deadlock-free interleavings of component AC-Graph actions that “respect” the coordination policy
AC-Graph (i.e., all the failure-free interleavings of component AC-Graph actions), “correspond to” traces of Kf .
Proving “Deadlock-freedom”, “Coordination-policy-preservation”, and “Component-protocol-preservation” means
proving the correctness of our approach. That is, the system formed by the components given as input plus the synthesized
failure-free coordinator is deadlock-free and guarantees the specified coordination policies. Furthermore, the synthesized
coordinator is the right one in the sense that it is correct with respect to the interaction protocol of the components and
the interactions specified by the specified coordination policy. “Completeness” is for proving the completeness. That is,
all the “safe” component interactions (with respect to deadlock-freedom and the specified coordination policy) are also
interactions performed by the synthesized failure-free coordinator.
Thus, by proving the above mentioned four properties, we prove that, after the failure-free coordinator has been
automatically synthesized, the only component interactions that can be performed through the insertion of the coordinator
in the system are all the possible safe interactions (i.e., correctness and completeness).
Note that it is enough to prove correctness and completeness with respect to only one coordination policy, although our
method allows the SYNTHESIS’s user to specify more than one policy. This is trivially true by induction since we guarantee
coordination policies by following an iterative process that, at each generic step, considers always a failure-free coordinator
and one coordination policy.
Proposition 1 (Deadlock-Freedom). Let Scba = (AC1[f1] | . . . | ACn[fn] | Kf ) be the CBA-system modelled by the parallel
composition of the relabelled component AC-Graphs AC1[f1] = (S1, T1,D1, s10), . . . , ACn[fn] = (Sn, Tn,Dn, sn0) and the failure-free
coordinator AC-Graph Kf = (S, T,D, sK0); then Scba is deadlock-free.
Proof. By contradiction, let us suppose that Scba is not deadlock-free and hence it has a deadlock state serr . It means that there
exist a deadlock trace t and a state s of Scba such that t = µ1µ2 . . .µm ∧ s µm−→ serr .
By construction and due to the relabelling, the ACi[fi] do not synchronize each other, but each of them synchronizes only
with Kf . Furthermore, for property “Strictly I/O Behaviour” (see Definition 12)we can suppose that there exist i, j = 1, . . . , n
∧ i 6= j such that µm−1 has been produced by a synchronization between ACi[fi] and Kf on actions !a_i and ?a_i, respectively
(for some a); and µm has been produced by a synchronization between Kf and ACj[fj] on actions !a_j and ?a_j, respectively
(for some a). Thus, by construction, in Kf , there exists the sequence of transitions v
?a_i−→ v′ !a_j−→ v′′ and v′′ is contained in the
tuple of states corresponding to serr . This means that v′′ is a deadlock state of Kf .
This contradicts the hypothesis that Kf is deadlock-free and, hence, the proof is given.
Before concluding the proof, let us explain why v′′ is a deadlock state of Kf . v′′ is a deadlock state of Kf because otherwise,
i.e., if v′′ would not be a deadlock state of Kf , from v′′, according to the specified coordination policy (see property “Policy-
Guarantee” of Definition 19), Kf would be able to perform a sequence of input-output transitions. By construction of Kf (see
property “Strictly I/O Behaviour” of Definition 12), Kf is a passive component that performs an input only if there exists a
component performing the corresponding output and vice versa. Thus if v′′ would not be a deadlock state of Kf , this would
mean that, in serr , would exist two components that can synchronize with Kf , one would perform the output action that
synchronizes with the input action of Kf and the other would perform the input action that synchronizes with the output
action of Kf . This would also mean that serr is not a deadlock state of Scba because we have above shown that by construction
from serr would be still possible to perform some action. Due to this contradiction, as done above, we can only conclude that
v′′ is a deadlock state of Kf . 
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Proposition 2 (Coordination-Policy-Preservation). Let Kf = (S, T,D, sK0) be the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph for the
relabelled component AC-Graphs AC1[f1] = (S1, T1,D1, s10), . . . , ACn[fn] = (Sn, Tn,Dn, sn0), let K′ = (S′, T ′,D′, s′0) be the failure-free
coordinator AC-Graph for AC1[f1], . . . , ACn[fn] obtained one step before the construction of Kf (see the step 4.(b) of the algorithm
described in Section 5.5), let U = (⋃ni=1 Ti) \ {τ}, and let Pj = (SPj , TPj ,DPj , pj0) be the coordination policy AC-Graph, over CPActU ,
guaranteed against K′ in order to obtain Kf ; then ∀t ∈ Tr(Kf ) : ∃t′ ∈ Tr(Pj) : t ∼=U t′.
Proof. By contradiction, let us suppose that there exists a trace t ∈ Tr(Kf ) such that t = α1 . . .αm, and that there does not
exist a trace t′ ∈ Tr(Pj) such that t′ = l1 . . . lm and t ∼=U t′.
Due to the existence of t, there exists a state sKm ∈ S such that sK0 α1−→ sK1 . . . sKm−1 αm−→ sKm. Since Kf is the failure-free
coordinator AC-Graph obtained by guaranteeing Pj against K′ (that is its failure-free version before guaranteeing Pj), by
construction, each state sKq , with q = 0, . . . ,m, can be rewritten as a pair (s′q, pjq) where s′ ∈ S′ and pjq ∈ Pj. This means that
the sequence of transitions (s′0, p
j
0)
α1−→(s′1, pj1) . . . (s′m−1, pjm−1) αm−→(s′m, pjm) is in Kf . By construction, for property “Policy-
Guarantee” (see Definition 19), this means that ∃(s′q−1,αq, s′q) ∈ D′ : ∃(pjq−1, lq, pjq) ∈ Pj : αq ∼=U lq, with q = 1, . . . ,m. Thus, it
has been found a trace t′ ∈ Tr(Pj) such that t′ = l1 . . . lm and t ∼=U t′. This contradicts the hypothesis and, hence, the proof is
given. 
Proposition 3 (Component-Protocol-Preservation). Let Kf = (S, T,D, sK0) be the failure-free coordinator, and let ACi[fi] =
(Si, Ti,Di, s
i
0) be a relabelled component AC-Graph whose coordinator is Kf ; then Tr(Kf • Ti)τ ⊆ Tr(ACi[fi]).
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, let us suppose that ACi[fi] has no non-shared actions. By contradiction, let us suppose that
there exists a trace σ such that σ ∈ Tr(Kf • Ti)τ ∧ σ /∈ Tr(ACi[fi]). Let us suppose that σ = α1 . . .αh such that sK0 α1−→ sK1
. . . sKh−1
αh−→ sKh . Since σ /∈ Tr(ACi[fi]) then @α1 . . .αh ∈ T∗i : si0 α1−→ si1 . . . sih−1 αh−→ sih ∈ Tr(ACi[fi]) for some si1 . . . sih ∈ Si. This,
trivially, contradicts the hypothesis that σ ∈ Tr(Kf • Ti)τ and, hence, the proof is given. 
Proposition 4 (Completeness). Let AC1 = (S1, T1,D1, s10), . . . , ACn = (Sn, Tn,Dn, sn0) be the AC-Graphs of the components
forming the CFA-system (modelled as AC1 | . . . | ACn), let Kf = (S, T,D, sK0) be the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph for
AC1[f1], . . . , ACn[fn], let K′ = (S′, T ′,D′, s′0) be the failure-free coordinator AC-Graph obtained one step before the construction
of Kf , let U = (⋃ni=1 Ti) \ {τ}, and let Pj = (SPj , TPj ,DPj , pj0) be the coordination policy AC-Graph, over CPActU , guaranteed against
K′ in order to obtain Kf ; then all the deadlock-free interleavings in the CFA-system that “respect” Pj, “correspond to” traces of Kf .
Proof. By hypothesis, we can suppose that, in Tr(AC1 | . . . | ACn), there exists a trace t = µ1 . . .µm such that t is not a
deadlock trace.
By construction, since a µq (where q = 1, . . . ,m) has been produced either by a non-shared action αq of ACi[fi] for some
i, or by a synchronization between ACi[fi] and ACj[fj], for some i, j with i 6= j, on complementary actions αq−1 and αq with
αq−1 =!a and αq =?a for some a, t can be rewritten as a trace of input/output actions tI/O = α0 . . .α2m−1−k where k is the
number of non-shared actions in t, and for all h = 0 . . . 2m − 1 − k, αh is an input action ?a_i (for some a and i) and αh+1 is
an output action !a_j (for some a and j). By construction, we have that tI/O ∈ Tr(K′).
By hypothesis,we can also suppose that there exits a t′ ∈ Tr(Pj) such that t′ = l0 . . . l2m−1−k and, for all h = 0, . . . , 2m−1−k,
αh ∼=U lh. By construction, it means that ∃(s′h,αh, s′h+1) ∈ D′ : ∃(pjh, lh, pjh+1) ∈ Pj : αh ∼=U lh (with h = 0, . . . , 2m − 1 − k). For






h+1)) ∈ D (for all h = 0, . . . , 2m−1−k).
Thus, we also have that tI/O ∈ Tr(Kf ). This let us conclude that if there exists, in the CFA-system, a failure-free interleaving t
(i.e., a deadlock-free interleaving that respects Pj), then it corresponds to a trace tI/O of Kf and, hence, the proof is given. 
9. Related work
The architectural approach to correct and automatic coordinator synthesis presented in this paper is related to a large
number of other problems that have been considered by researchers over the past two decades. For the sake of brevity we
mention below only the works closest to our approach. The most strictly related approaches are in the “scheduler synthesis”
research area. In the discrete event domain they appear as “supervisory control” or “discrete controller synthesis” problems [6,
26] addressed byWonham, Ramadge et al. In very general terms, theseworks can be seen as an instance of a problem similar
to the problem treated in our approach. However the application domain of these approaches is sensibly different from the
software component domain. Dealing with software components introduces a number of further problematic dimensions
to the original synthesis problem. In the scheduler synthesis approaches the possible system executions are modelled as
a set of event sequences, the system specification describes the desired executions. The role of the supervisory controller
is to interact with the system in order to meet system specification. The aim of these approach is to restrict the system
behaviour so that it is contained in a desired behaviour, called the specification. To do this, the system is constrained to
perform events only in strict synchronization with another system, called the supervisor (or controller). This is achieved by
automatically synthesizing a suitable supervisor with respect to the system specification. In contrast to our method, there
is one main assumption to deal with deadlocks: in order to automatically synthesize a supervisor which avoids deadlocks,
they need to consider a specification of the deadlocking behaviours of the base system (i.e., the event sequences that might
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cause deadlocks). This is a problem because, for large systems, the designers might not know the deadlocking behaviours
since they might be unpredictable.
Other works that are related to our approach appear in the model checking of software components context in which
compositional reachability analysis [11] and automatic assumption generation [12] techniques are largely used. In [11]
Giannakopoulou, Kramer and Cheung described a compositional approach to efficiently perform functional analysis of
distributed systems. They validate the behaviour of a distributed system with respect to specified safety and liveness
properties. The hierarchical software architecture imposed on the system model to be validated allows them to reduce
its size. In fact, by exploiting the system hierarchical structure, they are able to check its subsystems against the specified
properties. At this point, each subsystem can beminimized in order to bemodelled as a single component and the analysis is
incrementally carried on. In contrast to our method they are able to minimize the model of the global system by performing
efficient analysis. However, the problem faced by their approach is limited to analysis while our technique goes beyond
analyzing functional properties of a system by also considering the problem of automatically forcing the system to exhibit
only deadlock-free and specified behaviours. In [12] Giannakopoulou, Pasareanu and Barringer faced a problem that can be
seen as an instance of the general problem formulated in Section 2. In the case of these approaches the treated problem
can be formulated as follows: given a component C and a desired behaviour B, find an environment E for C in such a
way that E(C) ≡ B under an appropriate notion of equivalence. In this approach when model checking a component
against a property, the algorithm returns one of the following three results: (i) the component satisfies the property for any
environment; (ii) the component violates the property for any environment; or finally (iii) an automatically generated set of
assumptions that characterizes exactly those environments in which the component satisfies the property. The difference
with our approach is that they automatically synthesize the assumptions that represent the weakest environment in which
the component satisfies the specified properties. That is, they deal with only two components: (i) one actual component
and (ii) its environment. Moreover, they find an environment in such a way that the specified property is ensured but they
do not guarantee the property for any possible environment.
Promising formal techniques for the compositional analysis of component-based design have been developed in [9,25].
The key of these works is the modular-based reasoning that provides a support for the modular checking of behavioural
properties. In [9], De Alfaro and Henzinger use an automata-based approach to capture both input assumptions about the
order in which themethods of a component are called, and output guarantees about the order in which the component calls
external methods. The formalism supports automatic compatibility checks between interface models, and thus constitutes
a type system for components interaction. The purpose of this work is different from ours. The authors check that two
components have compatible interfaces if a legal environment letting them correctly interact there exists. Each legal
environment is an adaptor for the two components. They provide only a consistency check among components interfaces.
That is they do not deal with automatic synthesis of component interface adaptors (i.e., automatic synthesis of legal
environments). However in [25] De Alfaro, Henzinger, Passerone and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli use a game theoretic approach
for checking whether incompatible component interfaces can be made compatible by inserting a converter between them
which satisfies specified requirements. This approach is able to automatically synthesize the converter. In contrast to the
work presented in this paper,with respect to deadlock-freedom, the specification of the converter’s requirements is assumed
to be correct. Thus if, e.g., the specification would erroneously introduce deadlocks, they would not be prevented by the
converter that it is synthesized in order to be completely compliant to its requirements specification. In other words, a
deadlock preventing specification of the requirements to be satisfied by the adaptor has to be provided by delegating to the
user the non-trivial task of specifying it.
Our research is also related to work in the area of protocol adaptor synthesis developed by Yellin and Strom [33].
The main idea is to modify the interaction mechanisms that are used to glue components together so that compatibility
is achieved. This is done by integrating the interaction protocol into components by means of adaptors. However, they
are limited to only consider syntactic incompatibilities between the interfaces of components and they do not allow the
kind of interaction behaviour that our synthesis approach supports. Moreover, they require a formal specification of the
adaptor dictating, for example, a mapping function among events of different components. Although requiring this kind of
specification enhances applicability of their approach respect to the one described in this paper, it is in contrast with our
need to be as automatic as possible. In fact even if other kinds of techniques to specify the adaptor are possible, providing the
adaptor specification requires to know toomany implementation details thusmissing part of the goals of thework presented
in this paper. However, if we assume to have as input that detailed adaptor specification, our approach can be used to deal
with the kind of incompatibilities that Yellin and Strom face in their work. In [3,30], we extended the approach described
in this paper in order to not only restrict the coordinator behaviour but also augmenting it in order to consider also such
incompatibilities.
In other work from Bracciali, Brogi and Canal [5], in the area of component adaptation, it is shown how to automatically
generate a concrete adaptor from: (i) a specification of component interfaces, (ii) a partial specification of the components
interaction behaviour, (iii) a specification of the adaptation in terms of a set of correspondences between actions of different
components and (iv) a partial specification of the adaptor. The key result is the setting of a formal foundation for the
adaptation of heterogeneous components that may present mismatching interaction behaviour. Analogously to the work of
Yellin and Strom, although this work provides a fully formal definition of the notion of component adaptor, its application
domain is different from our. Since, in specifying a system, we want to maintain a high abstraction level, assuming a
specification of the adaptation in terms of a set of correspondences between methods (and their parameters) of two
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components requires to know many implementation details (about the adaptation) that we do not want to consider in
order to synthesize the adaptor.
In our previous work [15,16] we describe an approach to automatically synthesize software connectors whose aim is
to restrict all possible component interactions in order to prevent deadlocks. In [17] we started also dealing with generic
behavioural failures beyond deadlocks. Although these previous works share most of the ideas contained in this paper,
they represent first attempts to face the problem of correct component assembly. The formalization provided in this paper
allows us to rigorously characterize the kind of deadlocks (i.e., observable deadlocks mentioned in Section 2.1 and formally
characterized in Section 5.3) and generic failures (i.e., formally characterized in Section 5.4) that we can automatically
prevent in assembling a component-based system. Thanks to this formalization,we prove also correctness and completeness
properties of our approach. Moreover, in our previous work, the decomposition described in Section 7 was not developed
yet and, hence, it was not clear whether our approachwas easily generalizable for multi-layered systems or not. Finally, also
the described case study is a new one respect to the case studies treated in our previous work.
10. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, by means of an explanatory example, we have described a coordinator-based architectural approach to
component assembly. Furthermore, we have validated the described approach on an industrial case study that concerns the
development of systems for safeguarding, fruiting, and supporting the Cultural Heritage. Our approach focuses on detection
and prevention of the assembly concurrency conflicts (i.e., deadlocks) and on guaranteeing coordination policies against the
interaction behaviour of the components constituting the system that must be assembled.
A key role is played by the software architecture structure since it allows all interactions among components to be
explicitly routed through a synthesized coordinator. By imposing this software architecture structure on the composed
system we isolate the component interaction behaviour in a new component (i.e., the synthesized coordinator) that is
inserted in the composed system. By acting on the coordinator we have that the system interaction behaviour can both
be deadlock-free and satisfies the specified coordination policies.
Our approach requires having a bMSC and HMSC specification of the system that must be assembled from which we
automatically derive the LTS description of the interaction behaviour of each component with its environment. Since bMSCs
and HMSCs are common practice in real-scale contexts, this is an acceptable assumption. Moreover we assumed that an LTS
specification of the coordination policies that must be guaranteed will be provided by the user.
In [30], we show that our approach is compositional with respect to the coordinator synthesis process. That is if we build
the coordinator for a given set of components and later we insert new components in the obtained system we can simply
extend the coordinator model already available without need to perform again the entire synthesis process. Moreover, we
have applied our approach in COM/DCOM and EJB real-scale contexts. To do this we have developed a tool called SYNTHESIS
implementing the entire method presented in this paper [30].
Analogously to other program synthesis algorithms (e.g., [22] by Manna and Wolper), our approach suffers the well-
known state-explosion phenomenon. The space complexity of the synthesis algorithm is exponential. This value of
complexity is obtained by considering the complexity of the coordinator AC-Graph generation and the size of the data
structure used to build the coordinator AC-Graph. At present we are able to reduce this problem by efficiently implementing
the model of the centralized adaptor. That is, we internally represent the model of the no-op adaptor symbolically by using
Binary Decision Diagrams. Moreover, it is worth noticing that our approach suffers the state-explosion phenomenon since
we want to keep the deadlock prevention process as automatic as possible, i.e., without requiring a specification of the
deadlocking behaviours or of the coordination policies that – when guaranteed – allow us to prevent deadlocks. Currently,
by requiring a specification of such deadlock-preventing coordination policies, we are able to synthesize the failure-free
coordinator in an efficient way (i.e., the synthesis algorithm has a polynomial space-complexity in the maximum number
of states of the components) as described in [2]. In this way, we loose in terms of applicability of the approach but we
definitively solve the state-explosion problem suffered by the current approach.
As future work, we plan to further reduce the state-explosion phenomenon by suitably combining our method with
partial order reduction [14] techniques. This would allow us to reduce the size of the state space of the coordinator AC-
Graph generation algorithm. By referring to the automata-based model checking [7], we are also working to perform on-
the-fly analysis during the coordinator model building process. Other possible limits of the approach are: (i) we completely
centralize the coordinator logic and we provide a strategy for the derivation of the coordinator source code which derives a
centralized implementation of the coordinator component.Wedonot think this is a real limit because althoughwe centralize
the coordinator logic we can actually think of deriving a distributed implementation of it; (ii) we assume that a HMSC and
bMSC specification for the system that must be assembled is provided. Although this is reasonable to be expected, it is
interesting to investigate testing and inspection techniques – such as, for example, the one described in [13] – to directly
derive from a COTS (black-box) component some kind (possibly partial) of behavioural specification; (iii) we assume also
an LTS specification for the coordination policies that must be guaranteed. It would be interesting to investigate more
user-friendly coordination policy specifications, for example by extending the HMSC and bMSC notations to express more
complex system’s behaviours.
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Appendix. Algorithms of the deadlock-free coordinator synthesis, and LTSs parallel composition
In this appendix, in order to make the paper self-contained, we report the algorithms performed by SYNTHESIS to
synthesize the deadlock-free coordinator and that are described in [17,18]. We also include the formal definition of parallel
composition of LTSs in the general case of more than two LTSs.
EX-Graph creation algorithm
As already said in Section 5.2, in order to automatically construct the LTS of the deadlock-free coordinator, SYNTHESIS
automatically derives, for each component AC-Graph, another LTS that is a component EX-Graph. An EX-Graph is a partial
model/view of the behaviour of the coordinator to be built. It is partial since it reflects only the expectations of a single
component. As it will be described in the following of this appendix, the LTS of the deadlock-free coordinator is built by
means of a unification algorithm over EX-Graphs.
The following is the algorithm that SYNTHESIS uses to automatically derive from an AC-Graph the corresponding EX-
Graph:
Definition 22 (EX-Graph Construction Algorithm). Let (Si, Ti, Di, si0) be the AC-Graph ACi of a component Ci; we define the
coordinator EXpected (EX) Graph EXi of the component Ci the LTS (S′i , T ′i , D′i , s
i
0) which is built by performing the following
algorithm:
• at the beginning S′i = Si; T ′i , and D′i are empty;• for all (µ, α, µ′) ∈ Di do:
. create a new state µnew, add the state to S′i;
. if α =?a (for some a), then:
add the labels !a_i and ?a_# to T ′i ;
add (µ, ?a_#, µnew) and (µnew, !a_i, µ′) to D′i;
. if α = !a (for some a), then:
add the labels ?a_i and !a_# to T ′i ;
add (µ, ?a_i, µnew) and (µnew, !a_#, µ′) to D′i .
EXi contains complete information for the interactions performed in order to make the coordinator able to synchronize
with Ci (e.g., action ?a_i synchronizes with action !a performed by Ci), partial information for the interactions performed in
order to synchronize with components different from Ci (e.g., action !a_# can synchronize with all the actions ?a performed
by Cj for some j different from i). As it will be described in the following, the partial information of all the EX-Graphs will
be handled by a unification algorithm over EX-Graphs and solved (i.e., instantiated with suitable complete information) in
order to produce the complete model of the no-op coordinator behaviour. The no-op coordinator is not the deadlock-free
one yet. It performs/models all the possible component interactions, i.e., the deadlock-free and the deadlocking interactions.
As it will be described in the following, through backwards error propagation [12], from the LTS of no-op coordinator and by
cutting the deadlocking interactions, it is possible to automatically derive the LTS of the deadlock-free coordinator.
In the following sections we present the algorithms required for the automatic construction of the no-op coordinator
and for the automatic synthesis, from it, of the LTS of the deadlock-free coordinator.
No-op coordinator synthesis
Let us now present the algorithm for the no-op coordinator creation. Since our algorithm makes use of a unification
technique over first-order terms [21], we name it unification of EX-Graphs. The no-op coordinator synthesis is actually based
on the unification of the component EX-Graphs. EX-Graphs represent the behaviour that the component expects from the
no-op coordinator. Each component has only its partial view of the no-op coordinator behaviour, by unifying all components
views we can synthesize the no-op coordinator global behaviour.
Definitions of “unifiable” pair of actions:
Referring to [21] we can say that abstractly, the unification problem is the following: “given two descriptions x and y, can
we find an object z that fits both descriptions?”
For our purpose the unification problem can be stated as follows: let an action_term be a known action label plus an
integer, which denotes the component that knows that action (e.g., (t, i) is the term that denotes the action t that is known
to the component Ci, that is t is an action label in the action alphabet of Ci); let an action_variable be an unknown action
label plus an integer number, which denotes the component that does not know that action (e.g., (v, j) is the variable which
denotes the action v that is unknown to the component Cj, that is v is an action label in the action alphabet of a component
Ck for some k 6= j); then given an action_term (t, i) and an action_variable (v, j), do t and v denote the same action? (i.e., is t
equal to v and is i different from j?).
It is worth noticing that our notion of term and variable does not exactly correspond to the usual notion given in the
context of unification over first-order terms [21]. Since our synthesis algorithm is based on the idea of iteratively trying to
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match unknown actions in an EX-Graph with known actions in a different EX-Graph (i.e., finding a syntactic match between
their labels), for the sake of simplicity, we consider a known (unknown) action as an action_term (action_variable).
In the following we give the formal definitions necessary to fully-define the notion of unification that the coordinator
synthesis algorithm is based on:
Definition 23 (Action_Term). Let (Si, Ti, Di, Si0) be the EX-Graph EXi of a component Ci. An action_term of Ci is a pair (t, i)
where t_i ∈ Ti (i.e., t =?a or t =!a for some action a).
Definition 24 (Action_Variable). Let (Si, Ti, Di, S0i ) be the EX-Graph EXi of a component Ci. An action_variable of Ci is a pair
(v, i) where v_# ∈ Ti (i.e., v =?a or v =!a for some action a).
Definition 25 (Unifiable Pair of Action_Term and Action_Variable). A pair of action_term and action_variable in the form of
((t, i), (v, k)) is unifiable if t = v and i 6= k.
EX-Graphs unification algorithm
Intuitively, we attempt to match known actions in a EX-Graph EXi (i.e., action_terms of Ci) with unknown actions in
another EX-Graph EXj (i.e., action_variables of Cj). In the following we will interchangeably use the terms state and node.
The following is the EX-Graphs unification algorithm we use to automatically synthesize the coordinator AC-Graph:
Let EX1, . . . , EXn be the EX-Graphs of the components C1, . . . , Cn forming the CFA-version of the composed system.
(1) Create the AC-Graph K of the no-op coordinator, with one node (initial state) and no arcs.
(2) Set as current states of the component EX-Graphs the respective initial states.
(3) Label, internally, the initial state of K by an ordered tuple composed of the initial states of all EX-Graphs. For the sake of
presentation we assume to order them so that the jth element of the state label corresponds to the current state of EXj where
j ∈ [1, . . . , n]. This state is the current state g of K.
(4) Perform the following unification procedure Unify(g):
(a) Mark g as visited.
(b) Let 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 be the internal state label of g.
(c) Generate the set TER of action_terms and the set VAR of action_variables so that (t, i) ∈ TER, if in EXi we have Si t_i→ Vi.
Similarly (v, j) ∈ VAR, if in EXj we have Sj v_#→ Vj.
(d) For all unifiable pairs ((t, i), (v, j)) do:
(i) if the state gi with internal label 〈S1, . . . , Vi, . . . , Vj, . . . , Sn〉 does not exist in K, then create it;
(ii) if the state gj with internal label 〈S1, . . . , S′i, . . . , S′j, . . . , Sn〉where Si t_#→ S′i in EXi and Sj v_j→ S′j in EXj, does not exist in
K, then create it;
(iii) create the arc (g, t_i, gi) in K;
(iv) mark gi as visited;
(v) create the arc (gi, v_j, gj) in K.
(e) Perform recursively Unify(g′′) for all not marked (as visited) states g′′, of K, such that there exists a state g′, of K, in such
a way that g−→ g′−→ g′′.
To make easier the understanding of a generic step of the unification algorithm, in Fig. 17 we show its first step of
execution applied to the explanatory example introduced in Section 5.1. Fig. 17 shows portions of EX-Graphs for the
components of the example. It also shows the no-op coordinator portion automatically synthesized by the unification
algorithm after the first unification step. Moreover, the sets of action_terms and action_variables built during the first
unification step are reported in the figure. Note that for each no-op coordinator node, there is also its internal label written
as a tuple of EX-Graph states.
The synthesized no-op coordinator AC-Graph (see Definition 12) might contain deadlock traces. The deadlock states,
in these deadlock traces, model possible deadlocks in the interaction of the components that has to be controlled by the
synthesized coordinator. As said in Section 5.3, by pruning the deadlock traces of the no-op coordinator, the LTS of a
deadlock-free coordinator can be automatically derived (see Definition 13). We recall that, for the purposes of the work
described in this paper, our deadlock-free coordinator synthesis algorithmproduces themaximal deadlock-free coordinator.
That is, SYNTHESIS automatically synthesizes the most permissive deadlock-free coordinator.
In the following section, we formalize the algorithm that is performed by SYNTHESIS to automatically derive, from the
no-op coordinator AC-Graph , the maximal deadlock-free coordinator AC-Graph.
Construction algorithm for the maximal deadlock-free coordinator
Let K = (SK, TK,DK, sK0) be the no-op coordinator AC-Graph.
(1) Set as current state s of K, its initial state sK0 .
(2) Perform the following backwards error propagation procedure, i.e., PreventDeadlocks(s):
(a) mark s as visited;
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Fig. 17. EX-Graphs unification step 1.
(b) if s is a deadlock state, then:
(i) remove, from DK , all transitions (s′,α, s), for some s′ ∈ SK , α ∈ TK ;
(ii) remove s from SK ;
(c) if s is not a deadlock state, then:
(i) ∀s′ ∈ SK : s−→ s′ ∧ s′ is not visited, do:
(A) perform recursively PreventDeadlocks(s′);
(B) perform recursively PreventDeadlocks(s).
The previous algorithm, in order to build the maximal coordinator AC-Graph, removes all possible deadlock traces in the
no-op coordinator AC-Graph by performing backwards error propagation. Informally, bymeans of a classical depth-first visit,
the algorithm first looks for a deadlock state. If it is the case that a deadlock state has been found, the algorithm prunes all its
incoming transitions and the same deadlock state. Otherwise, the algorithm is recursively performed on all the non-visited
successors of the current state. Additionally, once a successor has been visited and hence the algorithm has been recursively
performed on it, the algorithm is recursively performed also on the current state since, due to recursion on its successors, it
might be become a deadlock state. This is the case in which the current state was not directly a deadlock state but, however,
all the traces originating from it were deadlock traces.
Parallel composition of LTSs
Definition 26 (Parallel Composition). Let L1 = (S1, T1,D1, s10), . . . , Ln = (Sn, Tn,Dn, sn0) be n LTSs, their parallel composition is
the LTS L1 | . . . | Ln = (S, T,D, s0) where:
• States: S ⊆ S1 × · · · × Sn
• Root: s0 = (s10, . . . , sn0)
• Labels: T = ⋃ni=1 Ti ∪ {τ}
• Synchronization: ((s1, . . . , sn), τ, (s′1, . . . , s′n)) ∈ D ⇐⇒ ∃i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, α,α ∈
⋃n
i=1 Ti : i 6= j ∧ (si,α, s′i) ∈ Di ∧
(sj,α, s′j) ∈ Dj ∧ α 6= τ ∧ ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n} : k 6= i, jH⇒ s′k = sk
• Interleaving: ((s1, . . . , sn),β, (s′1, . . . , s′n)) ∈ D ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (si,β, s′i) ∈ Di ∧ ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : j 6= i H⇒ s′j = sj ∧
(β /∈ ⋃nk=1,k6=i Tk ∨ β = τ)
• Reachability: ∀s ∈ S : ∃µ ∈ T∗ : µ is a trace leading to s.
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